Institutionalising National Security: The Case for a Codified Legal Framework

India faces a complex and evolving set of security challenges ranging from conventional threats to cyber warfare, terrorism, and economic disruptions. Yet, its national security framework remains largely reactive and driven by executive discretion. There is no codified National Security Policy or institutional architecture to ensure continuity, coordination, and doctrinal clarity across administrations and security agencies.

Unlike some other democracies that have enacted robust legislation to guide national security governance, India operates on a patchwork of sectoral laws, ad hoc decisions, and overlapping institutional mandates in this domain. This personality-driven approach often leads to abrupt policy shifts reflecting changes in leadership, undermining strategic coherence and institutional memory. The need of the hour is a well-structured legal framework that provides stability, accountability, and long-term direction without compromising executive agility.

I. Need for a Coherent and Consistent National Security Policy

India’s current national security approach has evolved in response to crises rather than through strategic foresight or doctrinal deliberation. While it has dealt with various conventional and non-conventional threats, it lacks a formal doctrine or integrated framework to anticipate and manage new challenges, such as hybrid warfare, cyber threats, disinformation campaigns, and cross-border terrorism. These emerging threats cut across domains and ministries, demanding a unified approach.

Currently, there are laws in specific domains – such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, and the Telegraph Act – but there is no convergence of these instruments into a larger national security vision. As a result, multiple agencies operate in silos, often duplicating efforts or working at cross-purposes.

The Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, recently observed that India has necessary security structures in place. However, these are often based on executive orders or notifications rather than on legislative mandate. Such arrangements are inherently unstable, with little protection from political or administrative changes. In contrast, countries like the United States and the United Kingdom periodically publish formal security strategies backed by statutory institutions, to ensure continuity, inter-agency coordination, and strategic integration.

A codified national security policy, rooted in law, would guide coordination, resource allocation, and planning. It would allow for doctrinal development, risk mapping, and capability building in a structured manner. More importantly, it would transform India’s security apparatus from a reactive system into a forward-looking strategic framework.

II. Building National Security Architecture Through Law

Comparative models across major powers demonstrate how legal frameworks enable, rather than restrict, effective national security governance. The U.S. National Security Act (1947), along with subsequent laws like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Homeland Security Act (2002), provides the statutory foundation for the organisation of the intelligence community, oversight bodies, and inter-agency coordination.

Similarly, the U.K.’s National Security Act (2023) integrates intelligence services, modernises laws applying to espionage, and establishes safeguards for national resilience. Canada’s approach through its National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) also shows the benefits of a legislated oversight and review structure.

India, by contrast, lacks such comprehensive statutory backing. Most of its key national security institutions—intelligence agencies, strategic policy cells, crisis response groups—function through executive mandates and can be restructured or disbanded without parliamentary scrutiny. This leaves them vulnerable to political shifts and limits their ability to institutionalise long-term practices.

A legislative framework could fill these gaps by:

• Anchoring key institutions in law with clearly defined mandates.
• Requiring periodic strategic reviews.
• Institutionalising inter-agency coordination through formal platforms.
• Codifying doctrines and risk assessments.
• Creating predictable leadership structures insulated from political turnover.

For example, the U.S. requires an annual National Security Strategy to be submitted to Congress; a statutory obligation under the Goldwater-Nichols Act that ensures policy articulation and review. A similar mechanism in India could mandate the preparation and review of a National Security Strategy to be tabled before a designated parliamentary committee. This would ensure transparency, consistency, and institutional memory.

III. Acknowledging Legislative Limitations in Security Policy

While law is a necessary enabler, national security governance must respect the executive’s primacy. The Indian Constitution places defence, foreign affairs, and national security under the Union List in the Seventh Schedule, but it does not mandate legislative formulation of policy. This flexibility allows the executive to respond swiftly to evolving security environments.

Globally, legislatures play a limited, mostly oversight-oriented role in national security. In the U.S., Congress has the power to declare war and oversee intelligence funding, but real-time national security decision-making remains with the executive. The U.K. relies on the doctrine of royal prerogative for the conduct of national security and foreign affairs. Legislatures often lack access to classified intelligence, situational awareness, and operational coordination, making their direct involvement in execution impractical.

Accordingly, national security legislation in India should avoid micromanagement and focus instead on establishing enduring frameworks, processes, and institutions. Such a legal structure would not interfere in daily operational matters but would provide the constitutional scaffolding for sustained strategic planning, coordination, and oversight. This balance preserves executive agility while ensuring strategic accountability.

IV. A National Security Governance Framework for India

A proposed National Security Governance Framework should be structured around the following components:

• Strategic Objectives: A formal statement of national security goals encompassing traditional defence, counterterrorism, cyber resilience, critical infrastructure, and emerging domains like space and artificial intelligence.
• Institutional Codification: Statutory recognition for key coordinating bodies, including their composition, functions, and reporting lines.
• Budgetary Allocations: A legal mandate for adequate and earmarked budgetary outlays for national security preparedness, capacity building, and inter-agency coordination.
• Periodic Review: Legal provision for drafting and reviewing a National Security Strategy at fixed intervals – preferably on an annual basis – and for presenting it to a designated parliamentary forum.
• Inter-agency Mechanisms: Mandated coordination protocols, information-sharing frameworks, joint task forces, and integrated command models across civil and military agencies.
• Oversight: Limited but structured reporting to a bipartisan parliamentary committee, with clear norms to protect classified information and operational secrecy.
• Capacity Building: Legal provisions for establishing national security think tanks, academic programs, and human resource development institutions.
• Safeguards: Internal audits, grievance redressal systems, and integrity mechanisms to ensure procedural accountability without operational leakage.

Such a framework would not only improve inter-agency collaboration and continuity but also signal India’s preparedness for a new era of strategic challenges. It would create a balance between secrecy and accountability, flexibility and continuity, doctrine and execution.

Conclusion

India’s national security demands cannot be met with ad hoc decisions and unwritten conventions. A codified legal framework, tailored to the country’s unique constitutional fabric and strategic context, is both feasible and necessary. It would bring continuity, coherence, and credibility to India’s security apparatus without undermining the operational discretion required to protect the nation.

The time is ripe for India to institutionalise its national security governance through law. Doing so would not only enhance strategic preparedness but also signal its maturity as a resilient and forward-looking state. A robust legal foundation is essential not just to respond to threats but also to anticipate, deter, and contain them in line with India’s long-term national interests.

References:

 National Security: The Need for a Doctrine Authors : Abhijit Iyer-Mitra | Manoj Joshi https://www.orfonline.org/english/research/national-security-the-need-for-a-doctrine

https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/May/29/no-need-for-a-written-national-security-policy-cds-chauhan

 National Security Act (United States), 1947 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act

 Homeland Security Act, 2002 (USA) – Department of Homeland Security https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-act-2002

 National Security Act, 2023 (UK) – Home Office https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/32/enacted

 National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), Canada https://www.nsira-ossnr.gc.ca

 Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986