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A paradigm shift occurred in localised conflicts when Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and paramilitary group, was targeted by a sophisticated, remote-controlled, coordinated attack on its cadres. The attack involved triggering explosives placed in pagers and walkie-talkie sets. It began on September 17 when the pagers used by Hezbollah cadres exploded across Lebanon for approximately an hour. The next day, walkie-talkie sets used by Hezbollah were targeted. Hezbollah, designated as a terrorist organisation by the US and other countries, is considered in Lebanon as “a state within a state.” During these two days, according to Lebanese Health Minister Firass Al-Abyad, remotely controlled explosives inside pagers and walkie-talkies killed at least 37 people and wounded 2,931.
This is not the first time such tactics have been employed to remove a target. As far back as January 1996, the Israeli Secret Service eliminated Yahya Ayyash, a Palestinian bomb maker who played a significant role in the killing of 150 Israelis and the wounding of about 500 in a series of bomb blasts in 1994 and 1995. In an ingenious operation, a tiny, remotely triggered bomb was planted in a cell phone that Yahya sometimes borrowed to speak to his family. On Friday, January 6, 1996, when Yahya contacted his father on the cell phone, the bomb was triggered, and Yahya was killed. Other targeted operations have since used similar technology. However, an operation of the scale, intensity, and audacity that took place on September 17 and 18 in Lebanon is unprecedented. This will redefine the rules of war.
Most of the people killed and injured in the pager and walkie-talkie explosions were members of Hezbollah. There were reports of civilian casualties, but these were minimal, demonstrating the extensive planning and detail that went into avoiding collateral damage. While the number of people killed in the explosions is reportedly below 50, over two-thirds of the injured personnel have been incapacitated to such an extent that they are unlikely ever to take part in any military operation against Israel. Many need surgery on their face, eyes, or hands, and some have suffered amputations. In one stroke, the war-waging potential of Hezbollah has been significantly reduced, as the people using pagers and walkie-talkie sets were mostly tactical-level commanders. A significant but still undetermined portion of that leadership has been wiped out.
An operation of this nature requires detailed planning, high-end technology usage, an extensive and effective intelligence network, and political will. But before addressing the usage question, the moral question must first be answered.
Mr. Volker Türk, the current United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, made his position clear in a statement on September 18. Türk, an Austrian lawyer, said, “The simultaneous targeting of thousands of individuals, whether civilians or members of armed groups, without knowledge as to who was in possession of the targeted devices, their location, and their surroundings at the time of the attack, violates international human rights law and, to the extent applicable, international humanitarian law.” This argument defies comprehension. In war, when munitions are fired against the enemy, it is always without the knowledge of those against whom it is targeted. In the US war in Afghanistan, over 40,000 civilians were killed. Civilian casualties have been massive in wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and various other conflicts worldwide. Targeted attacks against terrorists and enemy soldiers using minute quantities of explosives designed to explode when receiving a specific algorithm are an acceptable method of taking out one’s enemies, especially when those enemies use terror to achieve political objectives and are ready to use the same methods and weapons. The UN’s moral argument against using such technology seems misplaced.
The targeted attacks in Lebanon demonstrated how algorithms can change the face of war by precision strikes on leaders and key personnel. This is what Bharat should now aim to achieve. We face challenges from terrorism emanating from hostile neighbours as well as inimical internal forces. Algorithms could be effectively used as war-fighting tools in our fight against such forces. As wars become increasingly hybrid, integrating cyber warriors into battle plans could significantly contribute to battlefield success, as the pager and walkie-talkie attacks demonstrate. Today, the frontline is blurred, and troops in contact may not be the first to face enemy action. The heartland is open to attack, and the list of possible targets is endless. These could include cyber attacks to disrupt communication networks, financial institutions, water and electricity supply, and other civic services. In conjunction with kinetic devices, the disruption achieved could be extremely severe. We must have matching or superior capabilities to deter our enemies from using such capabilities against us.
There is a need for thousands of cyber warriors, so India’s 2013 National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) aimed to produce 500,000 cybersecurity specialists by 2018. That target still needs to be achieved eleven years later. With its vast pool of young technical professionals, Bharat has no talent shortage. The challenge lies in finding the right people and incentivising them. This cannot be a bureaucratic exercise. Looking into the Israeli model would show how Bharat could harness its talent. Israel offers hybrid training opportunities, which puts the youth in line for plum jobs when they rejoin civil life. The most comprehensive program inducting cyber recruits after high school is Psagot—a military program that recruits high school graduates with exceptional talents for research and development positions in the IDF. As Israel has conscription, the security establishment has access to the youth of the entire country. It can screen and locate the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) elite, identify the highest quality people, and place them in military R&D. Training is carried out at the cyber defence training school in Beersheba. The campus is part of the J6 and Cyber Defence Directorate. Here, 18-year-old students will become technology experts. They are trained in all the high-tech fields—data center management, cloud-centered training, programming, and being the best software engineers.
Bharat must follow a similar path, like many other nations. In conjunction with our intelligence agencies, young cyber warriors can make a marked difference in the future battlefield. We live in an era of algorithm wars, and we must have cyber warriors to fight these wars.
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