India has completed 75 years of its journey as an independent country, and entered an 'Amrit Kaal'. It is not out of place to look back to our past and find out the real reasons for the painful partition of our motherland in 1947.
After winning the Mahabharat war, Pandavas went to Bhisma, who was still lying on the bed of arrows and waiting for death, to take his blessings and guidance on how they should rule the country; he advised them never to partition the motherland. He said it was a sin and added that since he had committed that sin, he was lying in that miserable condition. He advised Yudhisthir and Arjun to come to "Kurukshetra," i.e. act according to compelling circumstances, but not agree to divide the motherland. In the land of the Mahabharat, why did leaders of the struggle for independence clandestinely agree to partition and blatantly ignore the lesson of the great epic? This is the right time to examine all the facts afresh and come to a conclusion.
Much has been written on the two-nation theory, but most historians and political scientists appear biased and one-sided in their approach. By and large, they have tried to establish that behind the Two Nation Theory of Jinnah, the real force was the British colonial power and the Hindu Mahasabha's activism that helped it blossom. They very often quote V.D. Savarkar’s statement made on 15th August, 1943 at Nagpur.
Let us analyse the timeline from the sprouting of the idea of the "Two Nation Theory" to its culmination in the partition. Although Jinnah is regarded as the coiner of this infamous theory, the real architect of the edifice of the 'Two Nation Theory' was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Pakistani intellectuals also consider Sir Syed Ahmad Khan as the father of the Two Nation Theory. In 1876, one year after the inauguration of the Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, he made a speech at Benares in which he referred to Hindus and Muslims as two separate nations that cannot become one. Even during the revolt of 1857, he was loyal to the British and criticised the rebels. However, interestingly he also faulted British Rule, which had united the Hindus and Muslims and was responsible for their unity in the rebellion. Again, at Meerut in 1888, he addressed a gathering of local Muslim elites and reiterated his political vision of the Two-Nation Theory. By this time, the Indian National Congress had already been formed in 1885. Not only did he describe Muslims as a separate nation, but even more nefariously he dubbed Congress a Bengali Organisation. Thus, his goal, as it appears, was to keep Muslims united and to divide the Hindus on caste and regional basis.
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was working as a stooge of British Colonialism; the Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College was started on the 56th Birthday of Queen Victoria, on May 24, 1875. This college was inspired by the Cambridge Education System, and its first principal was Theodore Beck, who served the British Raj and remained the head of the college till his death in 1899.
This fact is also generally ignored or downplayed, as Sir Syed Ahmad was a typical Muslim aristocrat and a member of the Mughal ruling elite. He was born in 1817. His father, Mir Muhammad Muttaqi, was a personal adviser to Akbar Shah II, the reigning Mughal emperor. His Maternal Grandfather, Khwaja Fariduddin, worked as a wazir (Minister) in the Court of that Padshah. His Paternal Grandfather, Syed Hadi Jawwad bin Imaduddin, held a high mansab in the court of Mughal emperor Alamgir II. He was brought up not at his paternal home but at his maternal home, where he was exposed to court intrigues and dirty politics. In 1838, he entered the service of the East India Company and retired in 1876. Throughout his career, he was loyal to British Rule. Although Sir Syed had received an English education, he was never inspired by the French Revolution, the American War of Independence, or the ideas of Aristotle, Plato, Rousseau, Voltaire, or Montesquieu. The contrast becomes apparent when he is compared with Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833). Probably because of his divisive speeches, the British government knighted him in 1888 and twice nominated him to the Viceroy's Legislative Council.
What Was Congress Doing?
Here, it needs to be asked what Congress was doing when Sir Syed Ahmad was promoting Separate Muslim Nationalism Did Congress oppose his ideas vehemently, or even if it did, it was a mere formality? When 7000 people attended his Meerut meeting, why didn't Congress hold its annual meeting there and demonstrate that it was entirely against the "Two-Nation" idea? Instead, Congress held its annual session at Allahabad and made a Britisher, George Yule, its president. He was a shrewd businessman owning companies in India and England.
At that time, there was no RSS or Hindu Mahasabha. If Congress was a secular body devoted to the concept of United India, what did it do to stop the axing of this tree by a person like Sir Syed Ahmad? When you review the NCERT textbooks, you will find Sir Syed Ahmad portrayed as a great philanthropist and educationist. His political ideologies have been deliberately left out because people would ask what the other leaders did to counter or challenge him.
Even when the Indian Muslim League was formed by Nawab Salimullah of Dacca in 1906, Congress did not notice it. Neither in its 1906 session at Calcutta nor in its 1907 session at Surat was there any effort made to oppose the Muslim League. The first session of the Muslim League was held in Karachi in 1907, and it was presided over by Mushtaq Hussain, who was closely associated with the Aligarh Movement of Sir Syed Ahmad. Congress and its leaders made a blunder in allowing the League to occupy the space, but Left-Wing historians have blatantly ignored it. Instead of fighting the League, the Moderates of Congress were more committed to opposing Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Aurobindo Ghosh.
Lal, Bal, Pal, and Aurobindo were the leaders who practically opposed the effort of British Rule to divide India communally. When the partition of Bengal was made effective by Curzon on October 16, 1905, they started the Swadeshi Movement, an anti-partition agitation. It was the only movement of Congress that was against the effort to give Hindus and Muslims separate identities.
It appears vividly that whatever explanations may be given by their apologists, Congress, and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, and later, the Muslim League allowed themselves to be used as trump cards by the astute Rummy player, i.e. British Rule, for its benefit. Not only Congress but the League were formed and used by British Rule as a "safety valve", which is why they did not fight politically against each other openly even though their ideologies were diametrically opposite.
When a Muslim delegation of 35 eminent Muslims led by Aga Khan III met the Viceroy Lord Minto at Shimla in October 1906 and demanded a separate electorate for Muslims, the opposition of Congress was more formal and academic than real and formidable.
In the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, this demand of Muslims was accepted by the colonial government; Congress opposed and rejected it but did not launch any movement such as Swadeshi and Boycott to compel the British government to withdraw the decision. why were they soft on it even when a Muslim member of Congress cautioned that by granting a separate electorate to Muslims, the British had laid the foundation for the Partition of India.
More Surprising is the fact that in 1916, in the Lucknow Congress, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who had earlier spearheaded the Swadeshi Movement against the partitioning of Bengal on Communal Line, headed the Committee of Congress, which reproached the Muslim League but accepted its demand for a Separate Electorate. It was not a simple acceptance of the Muslims demand to ensure the protection of their religion and culture; instead, informally, it was an acceptance of the notion of Pakistan by the Congress, and later events proved the lucidity of this assessment. Mahatma Gandhi was present, but no Congressman opposed the motion, and Congress adopted it on December 22, 1916. The moot point is that Tilak was not a man of that disposition. His writings, speeches, and activities prove that he firmly believed in 'Akhand Bharat'. Why then did he negotiate with Jinnah? The president of the Lucknow Congress was probably Ambika Charan Majumdar, a moderate and a friend of G.K. Gokhale and Henry Cotton. The whole process might have been completed under the influence of moderate leaders, and extremists acquiesced to this proposal because they wished to rejoin the Congress.
Congress's Passive Stance on Rising Muslim Separatism
Even in the All-Party Conference of 1927, called to discuss the Nehru Report, the attitude of Congress was to placate Muslim communalism rather than confront it. It was Pupul Jayakar of the Hindu Mahasabha who opposed any negotiation with Jinnah. Pakistan would have been created much earlier if his demands had been accepted and if the British Government had accepted the Nehru Report.
In 1940, when the Muslim League, in its Lahore Session, categorically demanded the creation of Pakistan, the attitude of Congress was lacklustre. The Muslim League met at Lahore from 22nd to 24th March 1940, where Md. Zafarullah Khan, who later became the first foreign minister of Pakistan, prepared the draft of that demand, and A.K. Fazlul Haq moved this resolution, which was accepted by the Muslim League and in the same year, in December 1940, Congress held its annual session at Ramgarh (in Jharkhand) under the Presidency of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, but nothing was mentioned about Pakistan. At the very least Congress, which claimed to be a secular party representing the whole of India, should have denounced and criticized the demand of Pakistan, but it remained silent.
There is an age-old saying, "Maunam Swikriti Lakshanam": Acquiescence is similar to acceptance. But pseudo-secular and leftist scholars descrive V.D. Savarkar as equally responsible for partition. This is an effort to hoodwink those who don’t history. A great Leftist Historian, Bipin Chandra stated that Congress never saw the Muslim League as a threat. Even after the Partition, Gandhi and Nehru believed it to be a temporary measure and thought that Pakistan would soon be reunited with India. It was Mahatma Gandhi who forced India to pay 55 Crores to Pakistan while it was at war with the new state. In the contemporary geopolitical situation anybody can guess what kind of reaction this decision triggers among Indians. After when the "Communal Award" was announced by McDonald and a separate electorate was granted to Dalits, Mahatma Gandhi started his historic fast unto death against it, and B.R. Ambedkar was persuaded by him to sign the Poona Pact (1932) by which he gave up the demand for a Separate Electorate. Did Gandhiji stage even a weak protest against the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan that was a bigger threat to the Congress ideology than Ambedkar’s demand? Congress was the largest political party at that time. Hence, the onus of protecting and promoting its ideology also rested with it. If it failed in doing so, it should not blame others, at least not those whose presence on the political scene was minimal.
The statement for which V.D. Savarkar is blamed for fomenting the Two-Nation Theory is the resolution of Hindu-Mahasabha passed at the Ahmedabad session in 1937 and a statement made on August 15, 1943, at Nagpur in which he said, "We Hindus are a Nation by Ourselves and Hindus, and Muslims are Two Nations". However, on both occasions, Savarkar was referring to cultural identity. He later said that if Muslims trace their origin to Arabia, how could they be treated as Indians? He never meant two nations in a territorial sense.
Nehru's excessive sympathy for Communism and the Soviet Union also became a serious cause of the partition of India. Nehru failed to maintain his neutrality when the Cold War started after atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Nehru was an admirer of the Russian Revolution and its Soviet offspring. At that time, the Communist Revolution was already in progress in China under Mao Zedong and in Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. The West was worried by the fast expansion of Communism in Asia. and regarded it as a threat to its survival. Experts also say that the atomic strikes on Japan were meant to show the military prowess of the USA to the Soviet Union.
When Nehru participated in the League against Imperialism in Brussels in 1927, the West was convinced of his strong attraction to Communism. Thenceforth, the British government aggressively promoted the Muslim League as part of its divisive agenda.
Post Independence politics and Muslim appeasement:
After Nehru, the role of Congress has remained more or less the same, except for the creation of Bangladesh during the prime ministership of Indira Gandhi. However, in other respects, the attitude of Mrs Gandhi was not fundamentally different from the traditional view of Congress. In many ways, the Assam problem of the 1980s was her creation. She was not very concerned about the illegal infiltration of Bangladeshis into Assam, which was a deliberate attempt to change the demography of that State. Indira Gandhi, during her visit to Assam in the 1980s, addressed the crowd with khuda hafiz instead of Jai Hind to appease the Muslim community, which was largely composed of illegal infiltrators. She went to the extent of claiming that her rule was in conformity the true spirit of Islam. This was nothing but a blatant ignorance of the official secular ethos to appease Islamic fundamentalist forces. Rajiv Gandhi tarnished his image by amending the constitution to alter the verdict of the Supreme Court in the Shah Bano case, again to appease the hardcore Islamic maulvis. More recently, on the questions of the Ram Mandir and of the abrogation of article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, Congress continues to appease Muslims, even at the cost of the national interest. When Pakistan's army chief, Asim Munir, reaffirmed the two nations' theory and claimed that Hindus and Muslims are different, the reaction of Congress was wavering and lowkey.
On January 20th, 1972, the then President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, convened the Multan Conference, where two decisions were taken. The first was to acquire a nuclear bomb by any means, even if it meant eating grass, and the second was to bleed “India with a thousand cuts.”
This was the start of a bloody and complicated period between Pakistan and India. The attack in Pahalgam, J&K, on April 22, 2025, is the most recent manifestation of this idea. The attack claimed 26 lives, the largest number of civilian casualties after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. A response from the Indian state was imminent, given the benchmark set after the Uri and Balakot strikes.
The response came on 7th May, when in a combined operation by the Indian Air Force, Army, and Navy, nine terror camps were targeted through precision bombings. This wasn’t an escalation for escalation’s sake but a doctrine in action. India set a new red line. Four terror camps in Pakistan and five in PoJK were bombed, killing more than 100 terrorists. This set off a chain of reactions that has changed the power dynamics in the Indian subcontinent.
Operation Sindoor, as it was named, wasn’t only a military success but a strategic reset.
Following the bombing of terror camps, Pakistan’s military responded with heavy artillery shelling and drone strikes and launched a few surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) of the ‘Fateh’ series on India’s military as well as civilian infrastructures from Leh to Kutch. This was followed by the use of Chinese PL-15 missiles and UAVs/drones acquired respectively from China and Türkiye. This went on from 8th May to 10th May before a mutual understanding was established between the DGMOs of both countries. However, it is important to note that this understanding was achieved not through diplomacy but as a result of the exercise of military might.
India had responded to Pakistan’s counter-attack by launching drones and tactical strikes on the key military infrastructure of the country. India virtually hit all important cities and airbases of Pakistan—Karachi, Gujranwala, Chakwal, the Nur Khan air base in Rawalpindi, the Sargodha air base housing F-16s, etc. In total, 11 airbases were struck, destroying 20% of Pakistan’s air force assets, including Lahore’s air defense system, making India the only country to do so in a single operation, that too on a nuclear-armed country. Thereby New Delhi sent a clear message to Islamabad and its allies in Beijing and Ankara.
The Chinese HQ-19 air defense system was destroyed, and unable to counter the drones or missiles used by India. The PL-15 Chinese missiles were all intercepted by the air defense grid along the Indian border. The share of the Chinese arms manufacturers has tanked in the market, seriously damaging the reputation of Chinese defense equipment and industry.
This signals to Beijing that India is capable and ready to defend its borders against the so-called sophisticated Chinese weapons. This should be a cause of concern for the Chinese establishment, as the limits of capability of their arms have been exposed, resulting in a loss of credibility for Beijing's arms exports.
For India’s other neighbours in the subcontinent, those who have relied on Chinese support as a bargaining chip the takeaway is clear: China can no longer be seen as a failsafe ‘seurity provider’ against India.
Operation Sindoor showcases seamless tri-service synergy. From intelligence collection to precision strikes and preparedness for the threat of escalation by Pakistan’s military, India has showcased that it has a formidable military force with strategic clarity and operational capacity. What makes this operation significant is that India called out Pakistan's nuclear bluff and countered the use of the Stability-Instability Paradox by levying a heavy cost on the use of lower levels of violence. Pakistan has been using this paradox to engage in proxy warfare or limited incursions, believing that the fear of nuclear escalation would deter India from any major conventional retaliation.
Operation Sindoor is a testament to the synergy between politics, the military, and diplomacy backed by hard power. The doctrine of strategic restraint is gone; the shift in the doctrine is clear, the cost of escalation has been increased, and the nuclear threat isn’t a deterrent anymore. The messaging is stark; the new doctrine envisions a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, India will ostracise Pakistan, and it is for the neighbors in and outside the subcontinent to take lessons.
Restraint is no longer the buzzword; it is a thing of the past. Diplomacy will now be riding on the back of military power when it comes to Pakistan, and that is a benchmark for others to take note of, in case India’s sovereignty is threatened. Surgical dominance has replaced strategic restraint, and Operation Sindoor is not an anomaly but a template for future operations. This reflects India’s resolve to act preemptively when national sovereignty is threatened. This message is not only for Islamabad or Beijing but for the world at large.
Nonetheless, India should remain extremely vigilant about Pakistan. As Sushant Sareen in his latest piece for ORF highlights, despite having delivered a salutary blow to Pakistan, India should be realistic enough to know that the terror problem won’t go away overnight. India needs to keep building military and economic strength and forge an ideological and political strategy to eradicate jihadist terror. China will try to counter the narrative(truth) of India bypassing Chinese defence equipment with information warfare and counter-narratives. Thus, Sindoor is not the endgame, but the game has just begun. Operation Sindoor isn’t the final solution, but a taste of what India can do. The message is unmistakable: India is not only a great power, but also a formidable military power.
With Operation Sindoor, India has redrawn the terms of engagement in the subcontinent. This operation, unlike previous ones, is a defining moment in the making of India’s 21st-century strategic identity. After the decades-old Age of Restraint, the Era of the ‘Modi Doctrine' has begun.
Reference:
On the backdrop of “Operation Sindoor” the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has continued to make headlines by striking over 51 locations across Pakistan’s Balochistan province as part of its ongoing ‘Operation Herof’. Some of the key areas where these targeted operations were carried out include Kech, Panjgur, Mastung, Quetta, Zamuran, Tolangi, Kuluki, and Nushki.
According to BLA spokesperson Jeeyand Baloch, the targets included “Pakistani military and intelligence installations as a way to test military coordination and readiness for future war”. Further, India and the international community were urged to take “decisive actions” against Pakistan, warning that continued inaction could fuel further violence. “If Pakistan continues to be tolerated, its very existence may lead to the ruin of the entire world,” the group stated, accusing the country of fostering terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Additionally, dismissing accusations that the BLA is foreign a proxy force, the spokesman pointed out that “The BLA is neither a pawn nor a silent spectator”.
Despite decades of Baloch nationalist movement demanding autonomy and outright independence, these calls have not been heeded by Islamabad. Instead these voices have been suppressed through heavy military actions often in violation of human rights. As such these developments come as a part of a long-running insurgency and separatist attempts in the region caused by historical injustices. including Balochistan’s economic marginalisation and exploitation, coercive integration, and alienation.
Now, as BLA actions and the Free Balochistan Movement grow more coordinated and narratives of statehood gain traction on social media, the idea of a sovereign Baloch republic may get the support and recognition it had long longed for. While this dream of the Baloch people has a long way to go, any recognition or support from the international community could lead to a significant shift in the regional geopolitic, with a devastating impact on Pakistan’s internal stability and politics, amid ongoing tensions with India.
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes
War on Truth and A Call for Liberation
As noted in a previous article in The Diplomat, there is an ongoing war against truthful journalism in Pakistan, particularly in the Balochistan province. According to Reporters without Borders, Pakistan ranks 158 out of 180 in the press freedom indez, which is no surprise given that major media houses are either co-opted by the state or being silenced. Entire regions like Balochistan, Turbat, Awaran, Panjur, and Gwadar are being treated as no-go-zones for national and international media to restrict coverage of the atrocities committed against the Baloch people by the Pakistani military.
Onn 3rd May, 2025 on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day, leaders of the journalist community, including Balochistan Union of Journalists (BUJ) President Khalil Ahmed and Quetta Press Club President Irfan Saeed, highlighted how the media in Balochistan has been facing strict censorship and is not allowed to even publish news of the opposition parties.
Recently, with a series of tweets on social media platform X by Mir Yar Baloch, an advocate for Baloch rights, the Balock Liberation Movement declared Balochistan’s independence from Pakistan. Through those tweets he urged “the Indian government to allow a Baloch embassy in New Delhi and has called on the United Nations to send peacekeeping forces to Balochistan while asking the Pakistani army to withdraw from the region”. These developments have not only brought back international the attention to this neglected region but have highlighted the double standards of Pakistani authorities that have systematically oppressed the Baloch and violated their rights while constantly claiming to stand for the rights of Indian Kashmiris to gain freedom from an allegedly oppressive Indian rule.
Given this new-found spotlight on the issue, one must ask that if there is nothing really to hide why does the Pakistani leadership fear independent international media coverage in its largest province? Perhaps it is an attempt to hide a national failure and cover up double standards based on misguided notions.
Islamabad’s Iron Fist & the Spirit of Balochi Resistance
The people of Balochistan have faced severe economic marginalisation, exploitation, and human rights abuses ever since Pakistan went back on its word and occupied it in 1948. Now, Pakistan's government, its powerful army, and Chinese assets are facing the fiercest wave of resistance in decades from various Baloch rebel groups, prominent among them being the BLA.
This insurgency, led by the BLA, has not only intensified attacks on Pakistani security forces but has also targeted infrastructure built under the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port. In response, Islamabad has resorted to military actions and heavy-handed tactics, including extrajudicial killings.
According to data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in 2024 there were 774 fatalities (273 civilians, 315 SF personnel, and 186 terrorists/terrorists) including 250 incidents of killings compared to 471 cases of fatalities (160 civilians, 186 SF personnel, and 125 terrorists) and 169 incidents of killings in 2023, marking a rise of 64.33 per cent.
Interestingly, despite widespread violence, women too have been at the forefront of this resistance movement, in reaction to the Pakistani army's forced ‘disappearances’ of Baloch men and decades of economic exploitation and underdevelopment. In addition, with the Pakistani leadership distracted after Operation Sindoor, recent reports suggest that the Baloch rebels have intensified their attacks on the Pakistani forces in Quetta, where they reportedly hoisted the Baloch national flag.
Discontent of the Balochi People:
Despite repeated attempts by Pakistan’s government to portray the unrest in Balochistan province as a result of internal power struggles among tribal chieftains, the harsh military actions especially against women, and extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances speak otherwise.
The people of Balochistan have been systematically excluded from meaningful participation in economic and political activities in the region as a result of decades of military rule and centralised governance. As a consequence, the entire province, despite its rich natural resources, such as coal, copper, gold, and natural gas remains underdeveloped.
The natives attribute their pitiful living conditions to Pakistan’s forceful integration of the province and decades of economic exploitation. However, little heed is paid by both Pakistan and the international community to support the welfare of the Baloch people. Additionally, adding to their woes, massive infrastructure projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port project which is part of it, were launched without proper stakeholder consultation and led to mass worker migration into the Balochistan province from other parts of the country, prompting concerns among locals about demographic shifts and indigenous community rights.
As a result, getting no official recognition of or response to their initially peaceful protests, the Baloch rebel groups have resorted to coordinated and targeted coercive tactics such as the recent Operation Herof, the suicide bombing carried out at Karachi University, the Jaffar Express train hijack and the bombing of a bus near the Dasu hydropower project as way to deter Chinese workers and investments from coming into the region and to fight back against Pakistani military forces.
Therefore, there is a growing concern in the Pakistani government and in Beijing about Pakistan army’s inability to provide security to Chinese personnel working on various CPEC projects and maintain control of the sprawling region which is geographically and topographically comparable to Afghanistan and is therefore very suitable for guerilla warfare..
What is next?
Despite all the support on social media for a free Balochistan, Islamabad will not give up on Balochistan, especially without a fight given that the region accounts for nearly 44% of Pakistan’s landmass and holds billions worth of largely untapped mineral resources.’ On the other hand, the low population density in the province makes it unlikely that the Baloch fighters would stand a chance in a direct confrontation with the Pakistani military short of massice support from other powers in the neighbourhood.
As a result, the prospect for the emergence of a new state out of a division of Pakistan remains slim. Yet, two unexpected circumstances could make it more plausible. The first would be an intervention of the international community through the UN due to the poor state of affairs of the Balochi people and the second might result from inadvertent collaboration between non-state groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army along with other rebel groups across Pakistan. Coordinated action by such a coalition could cause a devastating blow to Pakistani armed forces as a result of multiple overlapping attacks forcing the PAF to fight various insurgencies at once..
In any case, if such an escalation is to take place in months to follow, regional players like China and Iran too will be drawn into this equation given China’s strategic investments and Iran’s shared borders. Therefore, in the context of the ongoing India-Pakistan standoff, any such development would not only risk raising the tensions between Pakistan and India but could pose to the entire South Asian region a critical security dilemma.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, has endured wars and decades of fraught relations. It is widely regarded as one of the most prominent transboundary water-sharing agreements globally. However, in an unprecedented move, India recently announced the decision to keep the IWT in abeyance, citing persistent cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan as the primary catalyst. This decision marks a significant escalation in India’s chronic dispute with Pakistan, moving beyond conventional military and diplomatic pressures into the complex realm of "lawfare." This article argues that India's suspension of the IWT is a punitive legal measure, grounded in specific legal justifications under international treaty law, and carries profound strategic implications for regional stability and international legal norms. Furthermore, it anticipates the inevitable legal counter-measures from Pakistan and outlines India's legal strategy to defend its actions, thereby illuminating the dynamic interplay of legal and strategic considerations in contemporary interstate relations. This analysis will explore India's legal rationale for keeping the IWT in abeyance, explore Pakistan's potential avenues for legal challenge, and articulate India's counter-arguments, ultimately assessing the broader ramifications of this pivotal development.
I. The Indus Waters Treaty: A Brief Overview and Historical Context
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), brokered by the World Bank and signed by India and Pakistan in September 1960, stands as a landmark agreement governing the sharing of the waters of the Indus River system. Designed to ensure an equitable distribution of resources essential for agriculture and sustenance, the treaty allocated the waters of the Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) to India for unrestricted use, while granting Pakistan control over the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab). Notably, the IWT is often cited as one of the most generous water-sharing arrangements in the world. This generosity has also been a source of contention within India. Many Indian experts have long viewed the treaty as lopsided in favour of Pakistan, arguing that it concedes too much control over the western rivers, potentially hindering India's future developmental projects. The IWT incorporated a detailed, multi-tiered dispute resolution mechanism, beginning with the Permanent Indus Commission, escalating to a Neutral Expert, and ultimately, to a Court of Arbitration. This framework, devoid of an explicit exit or suspension clause, has endured several wars and decades of intense diplomatic and military hostilities. Despite its longevity, it has faced intermittent challenges and disputes over technical interpretations, yet none have threatened its fundamental existence as profoundly as the recent events have.
India's decision to keep the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance is a calculated legal measure, underpinned by specific legal arguments rooted in international treaty law. While the IWT lacks an explicit termination clause, India's legal strategy hinges on established principles that permit the suspension or even termination of treaties under exceptional circumstances. These justifications primarily draw upon the customary international law principles enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), even though India is not a signatory to the Convention.
It is pertinent to note India's deliberate choice of the term 'abeyance' over 'suspension' when articulating its stance on the Indus Waters Treaty. While 'suspension' is a formally recognised legal term in international treaty law, often implying a temporary cessation under specific conditions outlined in treaties or customary law (like the VCLT), 'abeyance' signifies a state of temporary inactivity or dormancy. This distinction is strategically significant; 'abeyance' is not a formal term within the VCLT or the IWT itself, granting India a degree of flexibility and strategic ambiguity. It allows India to signal a profound pause in operational cooperation and treaty implementation—linking it directly to Pakistan's conduct—without formally invoking the more rigid and escalatory legal processes associated with a definitive 'suspension' or 'termination.' This nuanced approach aims to exert pressure and articulate India's grievances while retaining diplomatic and legal manoeuvrability.
A. Rebus Sic Stantibus (Fundamental Change of Circumstances)
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, codified in Article 62 of the VCLT, allows a state to invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty. For this principle to apply, the change must have been unforeseen at the time of the treaty's conclusion, the existence of those circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of the parties' consent to be bound by the treaty, and the effect of the change must be to radically transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. India's argument posits that the "spirit of goodwill and friendship", explicitly mentioned in the IWT's preamble, was an essential foundation for its consent to the treaty. The persistent and escalating cross-border terrorism, allegedly state-sponsored by Pakistan, constitutes an unforeseen and fundamental change that has radically transformed the cooperative environment envisioned by the treaty. A treaty designed for peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit cannot be sustained when one party continuously engages in hostile acts that undermine the very premise of the agreement.
B. Material Breach of Treaty (Violation of Object and Purpose)
Another critical legal ground for India's action is the concept of a material breach, as outlined in Article 60 of the VCLT. A material breach occurs if a party violates a provision "essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." While Pakistan's support for terrorism does not directly violate a specific water-sharing clause, India can argue that such actions constitute a material breach of the IWT's overarching "object and purpose." The treaty's aim was not merely to allocate water, but to foster peaceful relations and optimal utilisation of shared resources. When one party consistently engages in acts of aggression and terror, it fundamentally undermines the cooperative and friendly spirit that is integral to the treaty's very existence and operational success. The continued flow of "blood and water" together, as India has often articulated, represents a violation of the treaty's foundational intent.
C. Countermeasure
India's suspension can also be framed as a legitimate countermeasure in response to Pakistan's prior internationally wrongful acts, namely state-sponsored terrorism. Under international law, countermeasures are actions taken by an injured state to induce the breaching state to comply with its international obligations. Such measures must be temporary, reversible, and proportionate to the injury suffered. By keeping the IWT in abeyance, India is signalling its resolve and applying pressure on Pakistan to cease its support for cross-border terrorism. While a high legal bar exists for the invocation of countermeasures, India would argue that keeping the treaty in abeyance is a proportionate response aimed at compelling Pakistan to fulfil its fundamental international obligations regarding non-interference and the prevention of terrorism from its territory, thereby restoring the conditions conducive to the treaty's operation.
India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has predictably elicited strong condemnation from Pakistan, which views the action as a unilateral breach of a binding international agreement. In this dynamic of lawfare, Pakistan is expected to use various international legal and diplomatic forums to challenge India's move, to which India has prepared robust counter-arguments.
A. Invoking the IWT's Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Pakistan's most immediate and likely legal recourse would be to invoke the IWT's internal dispute resolution mechanism, as outlined in Article IX of the Treaty. Pakistan would argue that India's "suspension" is a unilateral violation of the treaty, which explicitly states its permanence and lacks any provision for unilateral withdrawal or suspension. Consequently, Pakistan would likely seek to refer the "difference" or "dispute" to the Permanent Indus Commission, and failing resolution there, to a Neutral Expert or even a Court of Arbitration, as per the treaty's established hierarchy.
India's Counter-Argument: India would contend that the current situation transcends the technical or operational disputes envisioned by the IWT's dispute resolution framework. India's legal justification, based on rebus sic stantibus and material breach due to state-sponsored terrorism, represents a fundamental challenge to the very foundation and purpose of the treaty, rather than a mere technical disagreement. India would argue that the dispute resolution mechanisms are designed for interpreting existing clauses within a cooperative framework, not for addressing a situation where the underlying "spirit of goodwill and friendship" has been fundamentally eroded by hostile acts. Furthermore, India would highlight Pakistan's past rejection of India's repeated calls for modifications to the treaty, asserting that Pakistan's lack of bona fides in upholding the treaty's spirit undermines its right to invoke its technical dispute resolution clauses.
B. Approaching the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Pakistan might attempt to file a case against India at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging a violation of the IWT and the fundamental principles of international treaty law, such as pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept).
India's Counter-Argument: India possesses a strong defence against ICJ jurisdiction. India's declaration under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, contains crucial reservations. Specifically, it excludes disputes:
India would vigorously argue that the dispute falls squarely within these exclusions, given the context of cross-border terrorism and the inherent link to national security and hostilities. India would also reiterate its legal justifications of rebus sic stantibus and material breach, asserting that while the treaty is permanent, international law provides legitimate grounds for suspension or termination when foundational circumstances are radically altered by one party's hostile conduct.
C. Raising the Issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Pakistan could seek to internationalise the issue by raising it at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), portraying India's actions as a threat to international peace and security, potentially leading to a humanitarian crisis due to water scarcity.
India's Counter-Argument: India would counter this by arguing that the matter is primarily a bilateral treaty dispute, albeit one with significant implications, and does not constitute a direct threat to international peace and security warranting UNSC intervention. India would strategically pivot the discussion back to the root cause: Pakistan's persistent support for cross-border terrorism, which is itself a recognised threat to international peace and security. India would argue that the UNSC's primary focus should be on addressing the source of instability – terrorism – rather than the legitimate countermeasures taken by a victim state. Furthermore, India's strong diplomatic ties with several permanent members of the UNSC (e.g., the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) might prevent any resolution or action detrimental to India's position in that body.
D. Other Diplomatic and Economic Measures
Beyond formal legal avenues, Pakistan might engage in extensive diplomatic lobbying, seeking support from other nations, particularly those in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or its close ally China. It might also consider retaliatory economic measures.
India's Counter-Argument: India would engage in proactive and robust diplomatic outreach, presenting its comprehensive legal arguments and the factual evidence of Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism to key international actors. India's aim would be to shape the global narrative by emphasising that its action is a defensive measure against persistent aggression, rather than an arbitrary violation of international law. India would also leverage its growing economic and strategic partnerships to mitigate any economic or diplomatic pressure.
India's decision to suspend the IWT, viewed as a necessary legal and diplomatic measure in response to persistent cross-border terrorism, carries significant strategic implications that extend beyond immediate water politics. Firstly, it serves as a powerful signal and deterrent to Pakistan, unequivocally demonstrating India's resolve to employ all instruments of statecraft, including legal and treaty-based avenues, to safeguard its security interests. This move underscores a willingness to challenge established norms when national security is fundamentally threatened. Secondly, it prompts a re-evaluation of India's broader international commitments. This action could set a precedent for India's approach to other treaties where the foundational principles of cooperation are undermined by hostile state actions, potentially influencing India's strategy in future multilateral agreements. Lastly, the suspension inevitably impacts international legal norms and perceptions. While challenging a model treaty, India aims to articulate a justifiable legal basis, striving to manage international perceptions of its role as a responsible actor within the framework of international law, even as it asserts its sovereign right to respond to aggression.
While India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty is anchored in strong legal justifications, it is not without significant challenges and uncertainties for the future. Foremost among these is the inherent potential for escalation, as Pakistan views the action as a grave violation. India must meticulously plan for, and withstand international scrutiny and potential diplomatic pressure, especially from nations ostensibly concerned about regional stability or adherence to international treaty law. Effectively communicating its legal rationale and compelling evidence of cross-border terrorism will be crucial for managing global perceptions. Furthermore, while the suspension is a strong signal, India's immediate practical ability to halt the flow of western river waters is constrained by existing infrastructure. Thus, the long-term strategic success of this legal measure hinges on its capacity to compel Pakistan to cease terror support, rather than immediately altering water flows, while simultaneously securing India's long-term water security in the context of its legitimate developmental needs for the western rivers.
India's decision to keep the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance is a watershed act in the complex interplay of international law and strategic security in the Indian subcontinent. Far from being a mere political manoeuvre, this action is a deliberate legal measure rooted in compelling justifications under customary international law, particularly rebus sic stantibus and material breach, stemming from state-sponsored cross-border terrorism from Pakistan. While this move is designed to signal India's resolute deterrence policy and compel a shift in Pakistan's conduct, it simultaneously inaugurates a new phase of counter-lawfare, with Pakistan poised to challenge India in various international forums. India's robust legal defence, leveraging jurisdictional limitations in international courts and asserting the fundamental breakdown of the treaty's cooperative spirit, will be decisive. Ultimately, this episode underscores the evolving nature of lawfare in the Indian strategic context, highlighting how legal instruments are increasingly wielded as powerful tools in geopolitical contests, demanding agile legal diplomacy and a meticulous defence of national interests on the global stage.
Recently,the United Kingdom and Mauritius signed an agreement by which the United Kingdom has agreed to cede the control of Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius; however the United Kingdom and the United States will keep the Diego Garcia Airbase. The Chagos Archipelago, which consists of more than 60 low-lying islands in the Indian Ocean was earlier governed by the United Kingdom as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). BIOT has long been subject to international condemnations and has been subject to legal disputes. In 2021, the United Nations special international maritime court ruled against the UK’s over the Chagos, recognising Mauritius as the rightful owner of the archipelago.
HISTORICAL AND STRATEGICAL CONTEXT
Although the archipelago has a land area of 56.1 sq km, it covers more than 15,000 sq km. of maritime space. For most of its history, Chagos was uninhabited, and the first permanent settlements emerged in the islands around the 18th century. Initially, under French control, the archipelago came under British control after the fall of the Napoleonic Empire. In 1965, The British constituted the BIOT which included the Chagos archipelago, the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches. Although Mauritius gained independence in 1968, the British retained control of the archipelago, even though they gave Aldabra, Faruqhar and Desroches to Seychelles when Seychelles gained independence in 1976. In 1966, The USA and UK signed an agreement whereby Diego Garcia, an island in the Chagos archipelago was leased to the USA for 50 years initially with the option of a 20 year rollover. The agreement also included a provision barring the civilians from staying on the islands. By 1973, the native population of the archipelago was fully expelled. Diego Garcia houses a military base that served as a critical node for American air operations during the Gulf War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Indian Ocean is crossed by a major intercontinental shipping lane which accounts for one-thirds of world’s cargo traffic and two-thirds of world’s oil shipments. The USA and The UK have a long history in the region and Diego Garcia is a critical base, given the rising influence of China in the region, especially in Africa. The Indian Ocean is the route for trade between China and Africa and, unlike the South China Sea, China has no claims or disputes in the Indian Ocean. One of the significant developments in the region was the China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement signed in 2019 and that came into force in 2021- the first such agreement between China and an African country. China is also trying to include Mauritius in its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but Mauritius has committed to remain neutral and focus on peaceful development, China’s constant outreach to Mauritius through various initiatives remains a concern, especially since China is trying to expand its footprints in the Indian Ocean region; therefore one needs to look at the implications of the deal recently reached between the United Kingdom and Mauritius on Chagos archipelago.
IMPLICATIONS
CONCLUSION
The handover of the Chagos archipelago is a transformational shift in geopolitics as it marks the end of the colonial-era strategic primacy of Western powers by giving smaller countries the ability to exercise autonomy. While the control of the Diego Garcia Air Force and Naval base still gives the USA and the UK access to the region, the rise of India and China along with growing Pan-Africanism in play are redrawing the political map of the Indian Ocean.
REFERENCES:
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Sengupta, A. (2025, March 13). Explained: The story of Chagos, the Indian Ocean archipelago that Mauritius claims, UK controls. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/explained-the-story-of-chagos-the-indian-ocean-archipelago-that-mauritius-claims-uk-controls-9883678/
Wintour, P. (2021, January 28). UN court rejects UK claim to Chagos Islands in favour of Mauritius. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/28/un-court-rejects-uk-claim-to-chagos-islands-in-favour-of-mauritius
British Indian Ocean Territory Administration. (n.d.). Governance. https://www.biot.gov.io/governance/
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Human Rights Watch. (2023, February 15). “That’s When the Nightmare Started”: UK and US Forced Displacement of the Chagossians and Ongoing Colonial Crimes. https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/02/15/thats-when-nightmare-started/uk-and-us-forced-displacement-chagossians-and
Labh, N. (2024, May 30). Why Diego Garcia matters for U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/30/diego-garcia-us-uk-chagos-military-base/
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Ghosh, S. (2025, March 12). India’s support for Chagos sovereignty speaks volumes. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-s-support-chagos-sovereignty-speaks-volumes
Recently there were reports that many Korean products are receiving negative ratings from various accounts on Youtube and Naver that eventually turned out to be Chinese netizens. These accounts deliberately gave low ratings to Korean products and provided an alternative with Chinese products. The report read that this activity is occurring only with those products in which Korea competes with China like electric vehicles, e-commerce products, and batteries. This phenomenon drew flak amongst Koreans who realised that scare tactics like loss of life or loss of monetary value were noted as primary reasons. However such activities do not occur in isolation.
Historical Background
South Korea and China are geographical neighbours and important members of the larger land mass of the East Asian Region. However, ideologically and historically they belong to different (read: warring) factions. Geopolitically, their allies have also been enemies of each other. Hence a bilateral relation between the two countries is often viewed with the prism of mistrust and animosity. Yet, the reality is quite different from the general assumption. In terms of trade, Sino-Korean relations have been quite symbiotic and peaceful. China has long imported semiconductors from South Korea, and thereby became the largest trading partner of South Korea. Not only this, South Korea was one of the few countries in the world that enjoyed a trade surplus with China. Data reflected 160 billion dollar worth of imports from South Korea as compared to 107 billion dollar worth of import by South Korea in 2018. This was largely happening due to huge demand for semi-conductors in China, largely supplied by Taiwan and South Korea. Economically the two countries were so happy with each other that they signed a slew of free trade agreements in 2015 and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2020. However, things took a donwturn in 2023 as the trade surplus enjoyed by Korea turned into a deficit with China (by almost 20 per cent) and the US replaced China as the largest trade partner of South Korea. The reasons seem to be manifold with some blaming it on China for punishing South Korea after Seoul allowed the establishment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense- an American Anti-Ballistic missile defense system) in its territory while others blame the US for banking thesale of semi-conductors to China. Korea seems to have been caught in the crossfire between the two.
However, this is exactly where Korean resurgence and leadership come into play. Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy calls for ‘exclusion and targeting of no nation’; however it also means that it will not compromise on its national interests for the sake of balancing between the US and China. Korea has launched strategic initiatives with India in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region. However, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar called for a greater collaboration in non-traditional security issues such as green hydrogen, critical and emerging technologies, semiconductors, nuclear cooperation etc. India and South Korea call their bilateral relations a ‘special strategic partnership’ and the two nations have historically borne the brunt of being in geographical proximity to China. Hence it would be mutually beneficial to make their geopolitical and economic interests converge in ‘energetic’ terms.
There are various dimensions to a Sino-Korean relationship. First of all, the South Korea-China equation is still defined in the light of the rivalry between the USA and China, and Korea as not really regarded as an independent entity. It was found that other countries still view the actions of Korea through the prism of its symbiotic connection with the US and vice versa, rather than focusing on how Korean foreign policy will impact Korean national interests. Secondly, many countries see the East Asian region i.e. China, Japan, and Korea as a singular entity, due to which individual Korean position with other nations especially with developing nations is missed out almost completely and the dominant voice (aka: China) takes precedence. Lastly, much of South Korea’s foreign policy decisions are affected by the emotional scars of partition with North Korea. Since China is a very strong ally of North Korea, most South Korean leaders have taken an appeasement approach towards China to prevent an escalation.
Conclusion
A lot of oscillation has taken place in the Korean Indo-Pacific strategy as part of the fallout on the relationship between China and Korea. While political jingoism plays its part in winning elections, no country is able to trust China nor is it able to avoid trade with China. Hence the only alternative left for various middle powers is to collaborate among themselves to avoid a situation where their interests are compromised. Caught in the crossfire of THAAD and the Chinese Indo-Pacific strategy can Korea preserve its national interests? What shall be the equation in the trade between China and South Korea? What are the changing dynamics in Korea-China relations? How can Korea collaborate with India with which it shares traditional bonhomie? How can India and Korea collaborate to better the relations between the two?
Can Korea convert its special strategic partnership with India into tangible trade increase to benefit both countries and counter China, or will the professions of close friendship and cooperation remain more rhetorical than impactful? South Korea will need to decide on the course it wishes to follow.
