The US and Western powers misrepresented India’s non-alignment policy during the Nehruvian era. It originated from the Anglo-American capitalist mindset prevalent in the post-WWII period. While the US perceived decolonised India through a lens of polarisation within the post-war world order, India formulated its foreign policy in line with the fundamental needs of its demographic structure. After all, a country’s foreign policy must reflect its domestic policy.
Catering to the needs of a diverse society with a constitutional focus on democracy and secularism is a phenomenon that surpasses anything called non-alignment or neutrality. The so-called “neutrality of India towards the Middle East” and “friends with everyone in the Middle East” are necessities, not choices. Prior to 1914, the Indian administration paid insufficient attention to understanding the psyche and society of Arab nations, particularly the Gulf littoral states in close proximity. The consequence was that we created space for our political adversaries to tarnish India’s image in the Arab world. They attributed all negative traits to a Hindu society, often referencing Islamic scriptures.
Such was the intensity of the maligning that India felt compelled to insert the term “secular” into its constitution, primarily because India aims to shift the Indian Muslim minority from medievalism to modernism, overcoming many outdated and misplaced traditions and practices fossilised in Islamic jurisprudence as burdensome baggage.
There is, and remains, thoughtless opposition to this noble task, not necessarily from the Muslim orthodox school, but ironically, from some segments of non-Muslims in Indian society — the vote bank lobbyists. The egotism of vote-bank syndrome and the susceptibility of the Muslim mass psychosis to pretentious religious jargon reach a level where, despite enjoying constitutional rights and civil liberties, Indian Muslims go around complaining of discrimination.
The Iranian Islamic theocratic state under Ayatollahs has remained torn between two fundamental dichotomies, namely, ummah (religious community) versus nationalism. This dichotomy is so intense that the theocratic state had no qualms about undervaluing pan-Iranist celebrities, including Ferdowsi, the greatest icon of Iranian nationalism. Even the long poem (mathnavi) of the celebrated Sufi poet of the Islamic world, Rumi, was branded as ominous (kalam-i shoom) because he spoke of universalism rather than parochialism or factionalism.
Ideologically, secular and democratic India could not be at ease with theocratic Iran, not because it adopted Shia Islam as the state religion, but because it blindly and unreasonably believed in the call of the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini that Islam was destined to rule the world, and therefore the Iranian Islamic Revolution had to be exported. This was the reason the theocratic regime in Iran created strong proxies in West Asia and the Gulf region, including a few Shia factions. In the early 1980s, Kashmir experienced the influence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, prompting the Saudis to activate their intelligence agency Al Akhbarat. The reach of the Iranian pro-Islamist revolution extended far and wide.
By supporting lethal proxies in neighbouring Arab countries, Iran’s theocratic regime created a very difficult situation for India to pursue its fundamental philosophy of non-violence and non-aggression. When Iran and its proxies embraced violence as the state policy to condemn and destroy Israel, India found itself in a paradoxical situation.
More than 20 per cent of India’s oil needs are supplied by Iran. After some setbacks, Tehran, under its theocratic government, agreed to India developing Chahbahar port. It was expected to open up the Central and West Asian markets to Indian goods via the secure route through the Helmand valley in Afghanistan.
Considering these key paradigms, pragmatism and political prudence compelled India to distance itself from Iran’s internal instability. Recognising that democracy and secularism were both heavily compromised in Iran, India imposed self-restrictions on its relationship with Iran.
India has always declined to participate in defence or military alliances during war and peace. India has substantial experience showing that issuing condemnations does not ease tensions between warring parties but often worsens them. This stance has been maintained during the Russian-Ukrainian war, Afghanistan > US-NATO war, Russian-Afghanistan war, and others. In fact, India is the first country globally to voice its opposition to terrorism on various international platforms, emphasising the serious threats it poses to the free world.
India will not accept any shift in certain fundamental aspects of its foreign policy, because it believes that even the most complex situations can be managed through sincere dialogue. This is the core principle of India’s foreign policy—a principle that the world should hopefully embrace.
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