|
Listen to article
Getting your Trinity Audio player ready...
|
एकं हन्यान्न वा हन्यादिषुः क्षिप्तो धनुष्मता ।
प्राज्ञेन तु मतिः क्षिप्ता हन्याद्गर्भगतानपि ॥
“The arrow shot by an archer may or may not kill a single man but skillful intrigue devised by intelligent men can kill even those who are in the womb”.
Arthashastra 10.6.55
Prologue
Intelligence is the most essential tool in the hands of the decision-makers to keep the peace, avoid conflict, and shorten wars. Since the inception of humankind, intelligence has played a definitive role in its survival and progress from the caves to the cities, from hunting-gathering to fights between nations. In the words of Andrew Shearer; the Director General of the Office of National Intelligence of Australia; “Fundamentally, intelligence is nothing more than information that can provide decision-makers with advance warning of threats to our national security or our national prosperity but also of opportunities that we might face as a nation”.
In India; the role of intelligence has been widely recognized since ancient times. Arthashastra, the treatise on statecraft attributed to the Indian scholar-statesman Kautilya has vividly described the role and importance of intelligence in decision-making by the King. However, the Mahabharata gives us real-life examples of the significance of intelligence in decision-making in war and peace. As India’s Foreign Minister Dr. S Jaishankar wrote in his book “The India Way”, The Mahabharata is indisputably the most vivid distillation of Indian thoughts on statecraft. Unlike the Arthashastra, it is not a compendium of clinical principles of governance. Instead, it is a graphic account of real-life situations and their inherent choices”.
In this brief paper, we shall discuss two accounts from the Great War of Mahabharata where intelligence proved critical to the fate of the characters and the tide of the Great War, and we shall draw analogical parallels with 20th century events.
First Account – The Tragedy of Abhimanyu; the Brave Warrior or a Hapless Captive inside a Death Trap
After Bhisma’s fall, Dronacharya was made the commander of the Kaurava army on the 11th day of the Great War. He had a simple plan; capture the eldest Pandava, Yudhisthira, thus ending the war but it was easier said than done as long as the third Pandava Arjuna was on the battlefield. Dronacharya tried for two consecutive days to capture Yudhisthira with no success. To reach a breakthrough; he decided to deploy Chakravyuha, the most dangerous battle formation on the 13th day of the war. His plan was based on two factors.
First, Arjuna would be taken away from the battlefield by the Samsaptaks of the Kingdom of Trigarta who had an old feud with the third Pandava. They managed it successfully.
Second, Jayadratha, the king of modern-day Sindh had a boon from Lord Mahadeva with which he could defeat all of the Pandavas for a day except Arjuna. Dronacharya deployed him at the opening of the Chakravyuha to counter the Pandavas.
Once the Chakravyuha was formed, the Kauravas challenged the Pandavas.
Abhimanyu, Arjuna’s son and Krishna’s nephew, accepted the challenge although his knowledge was limited to the ingress of the formation. Yet Abhimanyu planned that he would open a breach through which the other Pandavas would charge in. Abhimanyu entered the formation but all four Pandavas were repeatedly defeated and repulsed by Jayadratha. In the Chakravyuha, surrounded by the best of the Kauravas, Abhimanyu fought valiantly but the death trap closed in on him. His death was inevitable.
The entire episode is nothing but an intelligence failure. Why so?
First had infiltration in or exfiltration from Chakravyuha been that easy then any of the Pandavas could have performed the task. Instead, it required specific knowledge and ability. Only certain warriors were capable of that feat. That’s why Abhimanyu was required even though he only knew how to penetrate it. Basically the lack of intelligence about the formation and the absence of Arjuna left the Pandavas with no options. So they relied on brute force and on the half-knowledge of Abhimanyu which ultimately proved fatal to him.
Second, Jayadratha because of his boon was capable of defeating the Pandavas except Arjuna for a day. Seeing him at the opening of the Chakravyuha, Pandavas did not feel the need to be cautious which means; the Pandavas were unaware of his boon. Krishna was aware of the boon but the sharing of intelligence by Krishna was always voluntary. There was no automatic sharing of such vital intelligence with the Pandavas about the capabilities of the high-value enemy combatants and it appears throughout the Itihasa that the Pandavas were often kept in the dark.
Third, Arjuna was the best warrior among the Pandavas. His absence from that battle on that fateful day cost the Pandavas dearly.
An analogy can be drawn between the above instance from Mahabharata and India’s Forward Policy before the 1962 war with China.
Like the Pandavas who were surprised when the Kauravas formed the Chakravyuha, India too was outplayed by China when the latter preemptively occupied the Aksai Chin and built civil and military infrastructure in that region throughout the 1950s.
Like the Pandavas who tried to make up for their lack of intelligence and capabilities by depending on Abhimanyu to get inside the Chakravyuha, India too tried to outsmart China by its Forward Policy of patrolling by setting up military outposts to outflank China.
Like the Pandavas who failed to support Abhimanyu inside the Chakravyuha; India too failed to support its forward posts logistically when China overran it.
Like the best of the Pandavas Arjuna who was busy somewhere else on the battlefield and could therefore not come to the rescue of his son, the Indian Air Force too was unavailable to support the Indian Army against the Chinese invasion.
Against a skilled enemy deficient intelligence combined with insufficient means may prove fatal. How India suffered in 1962 against China was similar to the distress of the Pandavas during the Great War. India’s lack of logistical capability to sustain operations in mountainous terrain and its failure to assess the Chinese intent and capabilities led it to lose the war. Likewise, the Pandavas failed to apprehend the ferocity of the Chakravyuha, the intent of the Kauravas, and their shortcomings on that fateful day.
Second Account – The Strange Story of Vriddhakshatra, the father of King Jayadratha
When Arjuna came to know about the demise of Abhimanyu; he identified Jayadratha as the one who had prevented the aid from reaching Abhimanyu. Arjuna vowed to kill Jayadratha the next day before sunset; otherwise he would commit self-immolation. When they heard of his pledge, the Kauravas resolved to defend Jayadratha to the last man so that Arjuna might be doomed by his vow. Jayadratha had received a blessing from his father Vriddhakshatra. Vriddhakshatra was aware that his son would be beheaded on a battlefield. Therefore to save his son and deter the “would-be assailant”, he cast a spell that the head of whoever caused Jayadratha’s head to fall on the ground would splinter into a hundred pieces.
As the war next day was nearing the end; it was almost certain that Arjuna would not be able to penetrate the Kaurava defensive ring around Jayadratha. Yet by using battlefield deception, Krishna helped Arjuna to fulfill his vow. Krishna further shared with Arjuna the most vital intelligence about Jayadratha’s father’s spell. Krishna advised Arjuna to choose the right calibre weapon that would not only decapitate Jayadratha but also project his severed head onto the lap of Jayadratha’s father who was meditating somewhere in a distant land. Arjuna did as advised. Seeing his son’s severed head on his lap all of a sudden Vriddhakshatra stood up in shock causing the head to fall to the ground. Vriddhakshatra died from the effect of his own spell.
Had the Kauravas been able to defend Jayadratha, Arjuna would have pledged to kill himself, and had the Kauravas failed to defend Jayadratha Arjuna might still have died due to Vriddhakshatra’s spell on his son. The situation led to a potential death trap for Arjuna either way. Nevertheless through the use of deception, the sharing of high-class intelligence by Krishna added to Arjuna’s superior combat skill, resulted in the elimination of the target and the threat attached to it. It is a typical example of the power of intelligence to change the course of war.
A parallel can be drawn between the above instance from Mahabharata and India’s war against Pakistan when it had to deal with the US Navy’s Task Force 74 in the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.
Like Arjuna who was supposed to eliminate Jayadratha within a day’s time; during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, India too needed to defeat Pakistan swiftly, before the latter received support from external forces, mainly from the US and China .
Like Jayadratha who had his father’s blessing, Pakistan also had pledges of support from allies like China and the US. President Nixon ordered the deployment of Naval Task Force 74 against India, comprising the USS Enterprise, the biggest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the time. Moreover, US Secretary of State; Henry Kissinger tried to persuade China to mobilize militarily against India although China refused.
Krishna when twilight came deployed his divine weapon, the “Sudarshana Chakra” to hide the sun, thereby giving the Kauravas the impression that the day was near its end. The deception acted so well that Jayadratha emerged from the defensive formation and became an easy target for Arjuna. India too was alarmed by the prolongation of the war which increased the chances of a foreign intervention in support of Pakistan; it used deception to shorten the war. On a signal intercepted by Indian intelligence, the Indian Air Force conducted an air strike on the Governor’s House in Dhaka on December 14 of 1971 while a cabinet meeting was taking place there. The effect was dramatic. Lt General Niazi received a message from General Yahya Khan that further efforts to continue the war were useless. Pakistan surrendered on December 16; 1971.
As Krishna shared the critical intelligence with Arjuna regarding the spell cast by Jayadratha’s father and advised Arjuna to choose the right weapon to foil that spell India too got a vital piece of intelligence regarding the deployment of US Naval “Task Force 74” and its mission. Like Arjuna, India too chose the right weapon to counter the threat from the US. The Soviet Union, being a treaty ally of India; responded by deploying naval elements including nuclear submarines against the US Naval Detachment.
The Kauravas bet on Arjuna’s demise because of the timeframe in which he would have to fulfill his vow and elude the spell on Jayadratha. Pakistan too was counting on the time it could manage to prolong the war against India to drag the great powers into the fray to defeat India or at least force a stalemate . Like Krishna and Arjuna India too was well aware of Pakistan’s design. With superior intelligence, a capable military force, and by garnering effective diplomatic and military support from the Soviet Union, India soundly defeated Pakistan in just fourteen days. It rendered the US Navy Task Force ineffective, as Arjuna had eliminated Jayadratha within a day and avoided the curse attached to Jayadratha’s killing.
Conclusion
Recently the Indian Army launched an initiative called PROJECT UDBHAV to churn out knowledge and wisdom from the ancient Indian treatises of statecraft like Kamandaka’s, Kautilya, and the Kural. However, as Dr S Jaishankar wrote, these treatises might well guide the strategic aspects of statecraft but Mahabharata presents real life cases for all aspects of policy from politics to diplomacy and intelligence to war strategy. A systematic and analytical study of Mahabharata can give us directions to navigate murky geopolitical waters.
India’s defeat against China in 1962 was due to its failure to assess Chinese intent and abilities, in addition to its own lack of preparedness. Instead during the Bangladesh Liberation War;, India correctly analysed the enemy’s intent, and capabilities and kept the advantage from preparation to execution. India’s situation in these two instances is similar to those the Pandavas faced on those two fateful days of the Great War of Mahabharata.
Decision-making in conflict completely depends on the availability of actionable intelligence, along with the ability to support the execution. It was true during the age of Mahabharata, it is equally true today.
Add comment