Category - Security & Strategy

On January 20th, 1972, the then President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, convened the Multan Conference, where two decisions were taken. The first was to acquire  a nuclear bomb by any means, even if it meant eating grass, and the second was to bleed “India with a thousand cuts.” 

This was the start of a bloody and complicated period between Pakistan and India.  The attack in Pahalgam, J&K, on April 22, 2025, is the most recent manifestation of this idea. The attack claimed 26 lives, the largest number of civilian casualties after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.  A response from the Indian state was imminent, given the benchmark set after the Uri and Balakot strikes.

The response came on 7th May, when in a combined operation by the Indian Air Force, Army, and Navy, nine terror camps were targeted through precision bombings. This wasn’t an escalation for escalation’s sake but a doctrine in action. India set a new red line. Four terror camps in Pakistan and five in PoJK were bombed, killing more than 100 terrorists. This set off a chain of reactions that has changed the power dynamics in the Indian subcontinent. 

Operation Sindoor, as it was named, wasn’t only a military success but a strategic reset. 

Following the bombing of terror camps, Pakistan’s military responded with heavy artillery shelling and drone strikes and launched a few surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) of the ‘Fateh’ series on India’s military as well as civilian infrastructures from Leh to Kutch. This was followed by the use of Chinese PL-15 missiles and UAVs/drones acquired respectively from China and Türkiye. This went on from 8th May to 10th May before a mutual understanding was established between the DGMOs of both countries. However, it is important to note that this understanding was achieved not through diplomacy but as a result of the exercise of military might. 

India had responded to Pakistan’s counter-attack by launching drones and tactical strikes on the key military infrastructure of the country. India virtually hit all important cities and airbases of Pakistan—Karachi, Gujranwala, Chakwal, the Nur Khan air base in Rawalpindi, the Sargodha air base housing F-16s, etc. In total, 11 airbases were struck, destroying 20% of Pakistan’s air force assets, including Lahore’s air defense system, making India the only country to do so in a single operation, that too on a nuclear-armed country. Thereby New Delhi  sent a clear message to Islamabad and its allies in Beijing and Ankara.

The Chinese HQ-19 air defense system was destroyed, and unable to counter the drones or missiles used by India. The PL-15 Chinese missiles were all intercepted by the air defense grid along the Indian border. The share of the Chinese arms manufacturers has tanked in the market,  seriously damaging the reputation of Chinese defense equipment and industry. 

This signals to Beijing that India is capable and ready to defend its borders against the so-called sophisticated Chinese weapons. This should be a cause of concern for the Chinese establishment, as the limits of capability of their arms have been exposed, resulting in a loss of credibility for Beijing's arms exports. 

For India’s other neighbours in the subcontinent, those who have relied on Chinese support as a bargaining chip the takeaway is clear: China can no longer be seen as a failsafe ‘seurity provider’ against India. 

Operation Sindoor showcases seamless tri-service synergy. From intelligence collection to precision strikes and preparedness for the threat of escalation by Pakistan’s military, India has showcased that it has a formidable military force with strategic clarity and operational capacity. What makes this operation significant is that India called out Pakistan's nuclear bluff and countered the use of the Stability-Instability Paradox by levying a heavy cost on the use of lower levels of violence. Pakistan has been using this paradox to engage in proxy warfare or limited incursions, believing that the fear of nuclear escalation would deter India from any major conventional retaliation. 

Operation Sindoor is a testament to the synergy between politics, the military, and diplomacy backed by hard power. The doctrine of strategic restraint is gone; the shift in the doctrine is clear, the cost of escalation has been increased, and the nuclear threat isn’t a deterrent anymore. The messaging is stark; the new doctrine envisions a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, India will ostracise Pakistan, and it is for the neighbors in and outside the subcontinent to take lessons. 

Restraint is no longer the buzzword; it is a thing of the past. Diplomacy will now be riding on the back of military power when it comes to Pakistan, and that is a benchmark for others to take note of, in case India’s sovereignty is threatened. Surgical dominance has replaced strategic restraint, and Operation Sindoor is not an anomaly but a template for future operations. This reflects India’s resolve to act preemptively when national sovereignty is threatened. This message is not only for Islamabad or Beijing but for the world at large. 

Nonetheless, India should remain extremely vigilant about Pakistan. As Sushant Sareen in his latest piece for ORF highlights, despite having delivered a salutary blow to Pakistan, India should be realistic enough to know that the terror problem won’t go away overnight. India needs to keep building military and economic strength and forge an ideological and political strategy to eradicate jihadist terror. China will try to counter the narrative(truth) of India bypassing Chinese defence equipment with information warfare and counter-narratives. Thus, Sindoor is not the endgame, but the game has just begun. Operation Sindoor isn’t the final solution, but a taste of what India can do. The message is unmistakable: India is not only a great power, but also a formidable military power. 

With Operation Sindoor, India has redrawn the terms of engagement in the subcontinent. This operation, unlike previous ones, is a defining moment in the making of India’s 21st-century strategic identity. After the decades-old Age of Restraint, the Era of the ‘Modi Doctrine' has begun.

Reference:

1. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/india-must-prepare-for-pak-endgame/
2. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/changing-facet-of-indias-tactics-to-win-the-war-before-the-war/?utm=inbtwarticles
3. https://swarajyamag.com/defence/what-we-gained-from-op-sindoor-and-what-we-must-prepare-for-next-time
4. https://chintan.indiafoundation.in/articles/from-asymmetry-to-architecture-reimagining-south-asian-security-beyond-the-pakistan-paradigm/
5. https://www.globalorder.live/post/india-and-pakistan-the-elusive-quest-for-conventional-deterrence-below-the-nuclear-threshold
6. https://chintan.indiafoundation.in/articles/operation-sindoor-and-the-modi-doctrine/
7. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128748
8. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128840
9. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2129141
10. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/operation-sindoor-the-pakistan-problem-temporarily-contained-not-permanently-addressed

On the backdrop of “Operation Sindoor” the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has continued to make headlines by striking over 51 locations across Pakistan’s Balochistan province as part of its ongoing ‘Operation Herof’. Some of the key areas where these targeted operations were carried out include Kech, Panjgur, Mastung, Quetta, Zamuran, Tolangi, Kuluki, and Nushki.

According to BLA spokesperson Jeeyand Baloch, the targets included “Pakistani military and intelligence installations as a way to test military coordination and readiness for future war”. Further, India and the international community were urged to take “decisive actions” against Pakistan, warning that continued inaction could fuel further violence. “If Pakistan continues to be tolerated, its very existence may lead to the ruin of the entire world,” the group stated, accusing the country of fostering terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Additionally, dismissing accusations that the BLA is foreign a proxy force, the spokesman pointed out that “The BLA is neither a pawn nor a silent spectator”. 

Despite decades of Baloch nationalist movement demanding autonomy and outright independence, these calls have not been heeded by Islamabad. Instead these voices have been suppressed through heavy military actions often in violation of human rights. As such these developments come as a part of a long-running insurgency and separatist attempts in the region caused by historical injustices. including Balochistan’s economic marginalisation and exploitation, coercive integration, and alienation.

Now, as BLA actions and the Free Balochistan Movement grow more coordinated and narratives of statehood gain traction on social media, the idea of a sovereign Baloch republic may get the support and recognition it had long longed for. While this dream of the Baloch people has a long way to go, any recognition or support from the international community could lead to a significant shift in the regional geopolitic, with a devastating impact on Pakistan’s internal stability and politics, amid ongoing tensions with India. 

Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes

War on Truth and A Call for Liberation

As noted in a previous article in The Diplomat, there is an ongoing war against truthful journalism in Pakistan, particularly in the Balochistan province. According to Reporters without Borders, Pakistan ranks 158 out of 180 in the press freedom indez, which is no surprise given that major media houses are either co-opted by the state or being silenced. Entire regions like Balochistan, Turbat, Awaran, Panjur, and Gwadar are being treated as no-go-zones for national and international media to restrict coverage of the atrocities committed against the Baloch people by the Pakistani military. 

Onn 3^rd May, 2025 on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day, leaders of the journalist community, including Balochistan Union of Journalists (BUJ) President Khalil Ahmed and Quetta Press Club President Irfan Saeed, highlighted how the media in Balochistan has been facing strict censorship and is not allowed to even publish news of the opposition parties. 

Recently, with a series of tweets on social media platform X by Mir Yar Baloch, an advocate for Baloch rights, the Balock Liberation Movement declared Balochistan’s independence  from Pakistan. Through those tweets he urged “the Indian government to allow a Baloch embassy in New Delhi and has called on the United Nations to send peacekeeping forces to Balochistan while asking the Pakistani army to withdraw from the region”. These developments have not only brought back international the attention to this neglected region but have highlighted the double standards of Pakistani authorities that have systematically oppressed the Baloch and violated their rights while constantly claiming to stand for the rights of Indian Kashmiris to gain freedom from an allegedly oppressive Indian rule. 

Given this new-found spotlight on the issue, one must ask that if there is nothing really to hide why does the Pakistani leadership fear independent international media coverage in its largest province? Perhaps it is an attempt to hide a national failure and cover up double standards based on misguided notions. 

Islamabad’s Iron Fist & the Spirit of Balochi Resistance

The people of Balochistan have faced severe economic marginalisation, exploitation, and human rights abuses ever since Pakistan went back on its word and occupied it in 1948. Now,  Pakistan's government, its powerful army, and Chinese assets are facing the fiercest wave of resistance in decades from various Baloch rebel groups, prominent among them being the BLA. 

This insurgency, led by the BLA, has not only intensified attacks on Pakistani security forces but has also targeted infrastructure built under the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port. In response, Islamabad has resorted to military actions and heavy-handed tactics, including extrajudicial killings.
According to data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in 2024 there were 774 fatalities (273 civilians, 315 SF personnel, and 186 terrorists/terrorists) including 250 incidents of killings compared to 471 cases of fatalities (160 civilians, 186 SF personnel, and 125 terrorists) and 169 incidents of killings in 2023, marking a rise of 64.33 per cent.

Interestingly, despite widespread violence, women too have been at the forefront  of this resistance movement, in reaction to the Pakistani army's forced ‘disappearances’ of Baloch men and decades of economic exploitation and underdevelopment. In addition, with the Pakistani leadership distracted after Operation Sindoor, recent reports suggest that the Baloch rebels have intensified their attacks on the Pakistani forces in Quetta, where they reportedly hoisted the Baloch national flag.

Discontent of the Balochi People:

Despite repeated attempts by Pakistan’s government to portray the unrest in Balochistan province as a result of internal power struggles among tribal chieftains, the harsh military actions especially against women, and extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances speak otherwise. 

The people of Balochistan have been systematically excluded from meaningful participation in economic and political activities in the region as a result of decades of military rule and centralised governance. As a consequence, the entire province, despite its rich natural resources, such as coal, copper, gold, and natural gas remains underdeveloped. 

The natives attribute their pitiful living conditions to Pakistan’s forceful integration of the province and decades of economic exploitation. However, little heed is paid by both Pakistan and the international community to support the welfare of the Baloch people. Additionally, adding to their woes, massive infrastructure projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port project which is part of it, were launched without proper stakeholder consultation and led to mass worker migration into the Balochistan province from other parts of the country, prompting concerns among locals about demographic shifts and indigenous community rights. 

As a result,  getting no official recognition of or response to their initially peaceful protests, the Baloch rebel groups have resorted to coordinated and targeted coercive tactics such as the recent Operation Herof, the suicide bombing carried out at Karachi University, the Jaffar Express train hijack and the bombing of a bus near the Dasu hydropower project as way to deter Chinese workers and investments from coming into the region and to fight back against Pakistani military forces. 

Therefore, there is a growing concern in the Pakistani government and in Beijing about Pakistan army’s inability to provide security to Chinese personnel working on various CPEC projects and maintain control of the sprawling region which is geographically and topographically comparable to Afghanistan and is therefore very suitable for guerilla warfare.. 

What is next?

Despite all the support on social media for a free Balochistan, Islamabad will not give up on Balochistan, especially without a fight given that the region accounts for nearly 44% of Pakistan’s landmass and holds billions worth of largely untapped mineral resources.’ On the other hand, the low population density in the province makes it unlikely that the Baloch fighters would stand a chance in a direct confrontation with the Pakistani military short of massice support from other powers in the neighbourhood. 

As a result, the prospect for the emergence of a new state out of a division of Pakistan remains slim. Yet, two unexpected circumstances could make it more plausible. The first would be an intervention of the international community through the UN due to the poor state of affairs of the Balochi people and the second might result from inadvertent collaboration between non-state groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army along with other rebel groups across Pakistan. Coordinated action by such a coalition could cause a devastating blow to Pakistani armed forces as a result of multiple overlapping attacks forcing the PAF to fight various insurgencies at once.. 

In any case, if such an escalation is to take place in months to follow, regional players like China and Iran too will be drawn into this equation given China’s strategic investments and Iran’s shared borders. Therefore, in the context of the ongoing India-Pakistan standoff, any such development would not only risk raising the tensions between Pakistan and India but could pose to the entire South Asian region a critical security dilemma.

A month has passed since the dastardly terror attack in Pahalgam, executed by Pakistan-backed proxies, killed 26 civilians, bringing into sharp relief the persistence of terrorism as a state policy of Pakistan for waging an asymmetric, unconventional war on India. Operation Sindoor, India’s calibrated, decisive strikes on terrorist and military infrastructure in Pakistan resulted in the decimation of terrorist facilities in Bahawalpur, Muridke, Bhimber, Sarjal, and Muzaffarabad. Pakistan’s unprovoked violation of Indian airspace through heavy-calibre weaponry, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and Turkish drones, were intercepted and neutralised by Indian air defence systems (AD); targeted, retaliatory strikes crippled Pakistan Air Force infrastructure in Murid, Chaklala, and Nur Khan, impairing the PAF’s ability to strike Indian territory. 

Operation Sindoor ushered in a new normal in South Asia’s security paradigm in four ways. First, it burnished active deterrence in response to terrorism emanating from Pakistan, resembling, but greatly surpassing in magnitude, the kinetic measures taken on terror networks after the attacks in Uri, Pathankot, and Pulwama. Second, as a corollary, the sweeping response, and the Prime Minister’s statements after Operation Sindoor, indicate that any act of terror will not be treated as an incident but as an act of war. Third, the kinetic measures were preceded by non-kinetic measures, including the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty, indicating an integrated, comprehensive response intended to punish and deter Pakistan at several levels. Lastly, by targeting military installations in retaliation, the operation effaced the distinction between conventional and non-conventional adversaries, treating both as a single enemy.

The cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan has cleared the fog of the conflict. Not only has South Asia’s security paradigm changed, but the threat of a two-front conflict has now materialised.  The clashes marked a high point of collusion between China and Pakistan evinced in the military hardware employed against India, China-Pakistan diplomacy, and information warfare. The ceasefire between India and Pakistan in 2021 coincided with the mobilisation of troops to the Eastern theatre to counter the Chinese threat, as relations reached a nadir after clashes in Doklam and Galwan. The recent flare-up hints at a cause for recalibration. Additionally, the two-front threat is no longer geographically contained in the East and the West; rather, Sino-Pakistani collusion has bracketed the two theatres. It is, therefore, imperative to dissect  Chinese motivations and expectations from its ‘all-weather’ alliance with Pakistan in light of the recent conflict and this article hopes to achieve that.

China-Pakistan Diplomacy during Operation Sindoor

China adopted an equivocal stance after the terror attack in Pahalgam, though the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry condemned it. However, within a few days, Shehbaz Sharif’s attempts at internationalising the terror attack and, by extension, Jammu and Kashmir, found resonance in Wang Yi, as he urged an international probe into the attack, potentially absolving Pakistan-linked/based terrorists of responsibility. Subsequent diplomatic communiqués, especially after the commencement of Operation Sindoor, demonstrated the privileging of Pakistani interests in Chinese strategic calculus over India’s legitimate security concerns and right to retaliate. After India struck terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, China reacted with ‘regret’, urging restraint’, in effect, putting the onus on India to scale down hostilities. The Chinese Ambassador’s meeting with the Pakistani Prime Minister and the latter’s telephonic conversations reaffirmed China’s alliance with Pakistan. India’s retaliation was framed as an aggression on Pakistan’s sovereignty, with Chinese state media echoing Pakistan’s disinformation on loss of civilian life and the downing of Indian aircraft.

Causes of Chinese Adversarial Policy

The shift from neutral to adversarial rhetoric can be attributed to a host of reasons, primarily  the clientelist relations between Pakistan and China. The conflict proved to be a testing ground for Chinese military hardware on which Pakistan has increasingly come to rely. Beijing has sold $8.2 billion worth of weaponry to Pakistan since 2015, and 81% of Pakistan’s military hardware imports  since 2020 originated in China. China co-produces the JF-17 fighter jets under a license manufacturing agreement with Pakistan, while theb J10-C aircraft, extensively deployed in this conflict with the JF-17s, were sold for over $30 million per aircraft. Both were equipped with PL-15 air-to-air missiles that misfired; China-supplied air defence system, the HQ-9P, and radars were flattened by Indian retaliatory strikes.

As China’s military-industrial complex markets itself to replace Western manufacturers in the Global South, Operation Sindoor couldn’t have come at a worse time. China, though the 4^th largest defence exporter in the world, has seen its defence exports decline by over 5% since 2019; more than 60% of its exports are absorbed by Pakistan alone. Since India has released satellite imagery of the destruction caused to PAF’s arsenal, the Hang Seng Defence and Aerospace Index has been plummeting.

The performance of Chinese advanced defence technology vis-à-vis India’s Western, Russian, and indigenous ammunition was therefore a matter of commercial and nationalist sensitivity. Chinese social media and news outlets aired unverified Pakistani propaganda. Xinhua, for instance, refused to call the Pahalgam attack a terrorist incident. Chinese state media parroted the DG-ISPR while publishing misleading, unverified reports of the downing of Indian jets by Chinese ADSs installed on Pakistan’s Eastern frontier, clearly to impart vigour to its defence-industrial complex for the consumption of the Global South. By airing false claims of collateral damage and civilian casualties in Pakistan, the China-Pakistan nexus aimed to paint India as the aggressor, supplying a moral advantage to Pakistan. Chinese social media was replete with disinformation, adulating Pakistani military.

The pattern of information warfare employed by China against rivals is an element of belligerence that operates below the State but not without its consent. Chinese state media colludes with social media companies to influence opinions in its rival country’s and world citizenry in favour of China, its allies, and proxies. Although China’s Foreign Ministry adopted a gradualist approach to enhance support for Pakistan, disinformation operations, already in motion, left little to conjecture about its stance.

The disengagement and patrolling agreement on the friction points in Eastern Ladakh did not reflect a thaw, but a calibrated return to a marginally less tense phase in a frigid bilateral status quo. It did not influence China’s expansionist designs on South Asia. By trying to hyphenate India and Pakistan and supporting the latter, China wishes to enmesh India in South Asian intrigues, impairing the rise of a competitor in the race for leadership of the Global South. Since the onset of the 21^st century, India’s pivot to Southeast Asia, East Asia, and, of late, the Gulf and Africa has redefined the notion of neighbourhood. The inking of CEPAs with the UAE and a CECA with Australia, in addition to the conclusion of FTA talks with Britain, have positioned India as a viable partner for the near- and friend-shoring strategies of major companies, as the Chinese economy faces disinflationary pressures amidst the exodus of foreign and domestic capital.

The pillar of the China-Pakistan ‘all-weather relationship’ remains the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the $62-billion project linking  the Maritime Silk Road with the Silk Road Economic Belt under the Belt and Road Initiative. Despite security challenges and Pakistan’s economic crisis, the CPEC has perhaps reached a point of no return. Its extension to Afghanistan, driven largely by the latter’s country mineral wealth, will raise the importance of Pakistan in China’s strategic calculus, taking the benefits of connectivity to Pakistan’s North-West and potentially restoring relations with the Taliban regime.

China is emboldened due to the retreat of the US. The uncertainty brought upon by Trump’s election—in addition to India’s strategic patience—arguably contributed to the disengagement process, allowing China to concentrate on the US by wooing its partners. Trump and the State Department’s misdirected claims of negotiating a ceasefire between India and Pakistan after calling it a bilateral issue have not aided the US cause. Those claims did not spring solely from Trump’s need for validation of his alleged negotiating skills—the absence of which in the Middle East and Eastern Europe is remarkable. That he salvaged Pakistan from humiliation after the Pakistan Crypto Council signed a deal with World Liberty Financial, linked with Trump’s family, is not coincidental. US companies also expressed interest in the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum, held in April. US actions on trade have not only soured relations with India; coupled with confrontational diplomacy with Europe, Canada, Japan, most of South America and South Africa; they strengthen China as the alternative superpower. In this situation, Beijing can concentrate on encircling India with PRC-friendly regimes to nip its ambitions.

To conclude, Operation Sindoor has paradigmatically altered India’s Pakistan policy and has exposed the depth of Sino-Pakistani collusion. India’s kinetic and non-kinetic measures have introduced a new strategic doctrine—one that no longer draws a line between state and non-state actors when national security is threatened. China’s calibrated diplomacy, military-industrial entanglements, and disinformation campaigns underline its evolving role as a belligerent actor.  To counter this, India must sustain its doctrine of deterrence, deepen strategic ties with like-minded partners, and invest in narrative-building across the Global South to offset Chinese (and US-European) media and political bias and influence.