The Places of Worship Act, 1991: An Orwellian Facade of Equality

“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”

– George Orwell 

The Places of Worship Act, 1991 (hereinafter, the Act) was passed by the Parliament on September 18, 1991. The purpose of the law was to forbid the conversion of any place of worship to another faith and to ensure that the “religious character” of any place of worship was preserved as it was on August 15, 1947.  When the Hon’ble Supreme Court was deciding a property suit involving the location of the former Babri Masjid, the Act was challenged. A five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously granted the Hindu god Shri Ram Lalla Virajman the title to the contested land on November 9, 2019. The ruling put the 450-year-old debate to rest, with all the parties accepting the Court’s decision peacefully. In that instance, the Court maintained the Places of Worship Act, 1991’s legality. It stated that the duties of a secular state are inextricably linked to the Places of Worship Act. The Court stated that it demonstrates India’s dedication to religious equality.

Since its inception, the Act has sparked controversy, with critics calling it vote-bank politics. Decades later, debates persist. In 2022, a Supreme Court bench led by then CJI DY Chandrachud ruled that the 1991 law does not bar investigations into a place of worship’s 1947 status, fueling fresh legal challenges and media scrutiny. While seen as a step toward communal harmony, the Act’s constitutional validity—especially Section 4(1)—remains contentious. By freezing religious sites’ status as of 15 August 1947, it aims to prevent conflicts but raises concerns over arbitrariness and constitutional rights.

Section 4(1): A Barrier to Reasonableness

The cornerstone of the Indian Constitution is the test of reasonableness, particularly under Article 19, which permits the judiciary to review legislative enactments to ensure they are just, fair, and reasonable. Section 4(1) of the Places of Worship Act fails to meet this test for several reasons. The retrospective cutoff date of August 15, 1947 is an arbitrary standard. By freezing the religious identity of all places of worship as they existed on this date, the Act ignores the varied historical narratives and injustices linked with specific locations. The selection of this date, set without any rational justification, violates the rights of communities seeking restitution for historical wrongs that they have endured over the centuries. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row (1952), the Supreme Court highlighted that the reasonableness test must be applied to each statute, and arbitrary measures cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.

By imposing a blanket prohibition on altering the religious identity of places of worship, the Act effectively nullifies the claims of Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs to reclaim sites they believe were unlawfully encroached upon by historical rulers. This denial disregards the principles of justice and equity enshrined in the Constitution. The ruling in Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) underscores that reasonableness is an essential element of equality, and laws must avoid arbitrary exclusions. The Act’s rigid prohibition on changes to religious identity curtails the judiciary’s ability to adjudicate disputes on a case-by-case basis. This blanket approach prevents the courts from considering the unique circumstances and historical evidence surrounding specific sites, thereby undermining the principles of fairness and justice. The Supreme Court, in Pathumma And Others v. State Of Kerala (1978), laid down guidelines for determining the reasonableness of restrictions, which Section 4(1) fails to satisfy.

The Test of Reasonableness

The test of reasonableness under Article 19 requires that any restriction on basic rights be proportionate, non-arbitrary, and justified by a compelling state interest. Section 4(1) fails this criterion on many counts because it imposes an absolute restriction with no option for reconciliation or remedy. A more nuanced strategy that allows for the adjudication of specific situations would have provided a proportionate response to the problem. In The Chairman of the Railway Board v. Mrs. Chandrima Das (2000), the Court highlighted that limits must be proportional and not arbitrary. While sustaining communal harmony is a valid state goal, it does not justify rejecting historical claims and suppressing judicial review. Instead of enforcing blanket restrictions, procedures that balance competing interests might promote communal harmony.

Multiple petitions have been filed challenging the constitutionality of the Places of Worship Act. Petitioners argue that the Act infringes upon the rights of Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs by preventing them from reclaiming places of worship that were allegedly “invaded” or “encroached upon” by historical rulers. These petitions highlight several key issues. Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion. By denying certain communities the right to reclaim their places of worship, the Act infringes upon their religious freedom.

Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law. The Act’s blanket prohibition creates an unequal framework where historical injustices against certain communities are ignored, violating the principle of equality. By freezing the status of places of worship, the Act undermines the judiciary’s role in providing remedies for historical wrongs. This suppression of judicial oversight is inconsistent with the constitutional framework.

The Way Forward

Although critics might interpret it differently,  it is an undeniable fact that the constitutional challenges to the Places of Worship Act expose its Orwellian nature—a facade of equality that perpetuates historical injustices under the guise of maintaining harmony. Because it imposes absolute prohibitions, the law must be struck down or restructured to allow for nuanced and equitable solutions. 

Understandably, there needs to be a limit on restitution based on historical injustices, or else it opens up a Pandora’s box of unending grievances. Yet, this consideration does not justify the arbitrary cut-off date of August 15, 1947. Claims, based on historical facts, should be evaluated meticulously on their merits while ensuring the stability of the social fabric is maintained. Centuries of unresolved historical injustices against a community inevitably breed resentment and animosity toward those responsible, regardless of the current majority-minority dynamics in India. The fact that Hindus in India are the numerical majority today, as they were historically, does not diminish the significance of the injustices inflicted upon them by Islamic invaders and colonial powers. This must be understood and evaluated and not only through the lens of majority-minority narratives. Correcting these injustices is not only about righting historical wrongs, but it is also an important step toward averting communal strife and building genuine and positive reconciliation in the present and future.

The Act’s blanket restriction unfairly denies communities with historical claims a path to justice. Instead of rigid prohibitions, judicial review should assess claims based on evidence, ensuring fairness. Independent commissions of historians, archaeologists, and legal experts can aid courts, while inter-community dialogue fosters reconciliation and avoids stoking tensions. Section 4(1) is not a tool for harmony but an instrument of imposed amnesia, freezing history at the expense of constitutional justice under the guise of artificial and arbitrary equality. A democratic, pluralistic society cannot uphold laws that sacrifice justice in the name of social peace. To uphold true equality and fairness, the Places of Worship Act must be repealed or amended.