The Eastern Indian Ocean is undergoing an unprecedented structural shift, challenging the regional security framework as the People’s Republic of China aggressively pursues a two-ocean strategy through proxy infrastructure networks. Amid this growing friction in the region lies the Great Coco Island, a highly strategic territory belonging to Myanmar, located just 55 kilometres from India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Thus, this strategic island is the ultimate gateway to the western end of the Strait of Malacca, which not only hosts $5 trillion in global commercial cargo annually but also serves as the main source of 80 per cent of China’s crude oil imports [1].
Historical Context and the China-Myanmar Geopolitical Nexus
To contextualise the significant infrastructure changes underway at Great Coco Island, it is essential to assess India’s security concerns and the region’s recent autocratic reconfigurations following Myanmar’s 2021 military coup [2].
Although several theories suggest that China has been conducting covert signals intelligence operations from the island since the early 1990s, with early intelligence reports indicating the presence of an antenna tower measuring between 45 and 50 metres, complete with radio intercept capabilities, the region’s present reality has been dominated by Myanmar’s isolated military regime, the State Administration Council (SAC).
With the military regime facing unprecedented economic sanctions from the global community, a severely weakened local currency, and a strong armed opposition within its own country from pro-democracy factions, the Tatmadaw finds itself dependent on China for its survival through concessions and advanced weapons technology. Leveraging Myanmar’s complete international isolation, China maintains an extremely powerful and asymmetrical bilateral relationship with Naypyidaw, one that allegedly provides shore and offshore bases for regional intelligence gathering and turns an already isolated string of islands into a front-line friction point for the PLA Southern Theatre Command’s broader strategy in the region.
Infrastructure Upgrades: A Data-Driven Geospatial Analysis
The most concerning and visible manifestation of this escalating threat matrix is the extensive, highly militarised development of the Great Coco Island’s physical terrain. Although successive regimes since1962 have maintained the island as a low-profile coastal naval base and penal settlement, the island has seen dramatic growth in its infrastructure in recent months. According to an intensive comparison of high-resolution satellite imagery from international commercial providers, subsequently analysed in a security report by Chatham House, it has become clear that the rugged terrain has been systematically modified to enable continuous, high capacity military flights and water transport [3].
The key technical aspect of this gradual militarisation is the extension of the runway. The old runway was an unpaved strip just 1,300 metres long, whichsignificantly limited operations to lightly armed transport aircraft. Geospatial imaging has now confirmed that, as of May 2026, the runway has been extended to a total length of 2,441 metres. The chosen length is not accidental; a runway measuring 2,441 metres, coupled with high-load-capacity PCNs, enables the island to host both medium-lift military transport aircraft and more specialised long-range maritime patrol aircraft such as the Chinese Shaanxi Y-8Q.
Satellite telemetry data indicate that two mammoth hangar buildings have been constructed simultaneously on the island, each up to 40 metres wide, along with administrative facilities in the northern part and an improved maritime pier for heavy duty ships.
Expert Assessment and The Intelligence Threat
The scale of the infrastructure and its specific technical features clearly indicate operational capabilities that exceed those of ordinary coastal surveillance operations carried out by Myanmar’s military forces, and instead signify an advanced system carefully constructed to facilitate extensive foreign espionage activities. In light of the dire consequences this development would entail for the entire region, Jason Tower, the Myanmar country director at the United States Institute of Peace, made the situation clear in a comprehensive international security brief, stating:“With Myanmar reliant on China for international support and economic development, it is extremely likely that the army would share intelligence with Beijing, and support China’s strategic initiatives… It presents a significant challenge to regional security, and will likely generate significant tensions between China and India in the Bay of Bengal”[4].
He highlighted the provocative nature of the construction, stating that Myanmar cannot build such elaborate and highly expensive maritime strike infrastructure on a remote island while it is simultaneously engaged in a life and death struggle within its own nation. This evaluation aligns with intelligence from various sources regarding the construction, which indicates that the facilities can serve as a forward operating location for Chinese technical personnel working under the Information Support Force of the PLA, thereby giving Beijing free and unhindered access to a much more extensive signals collection network located right at India’s maritime doorstep.
SIGINT Capabilities
The main threat posed by the emerging militarisation of the Coco Islands to India’s security structure is not only the risk of physical intrusion into its territory but also the imminent threat of electronic espionage, which would eventually undermine India’s strategic nuclear deterrent in the region. Port Blair, the headquarters of India’s tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command is 300km from the Coco Islands. The island has been equipped with a powerful radar system built on its highest point, which is about 91 meters above sea level. The radar system is covered by a massive,reinforced radome 11.5 meters in diameter. This radome houses what aerospace security analysts have determined to be a highly advanced phased-arraysurface-tracking radar operating in both the S-band and X-band frequencies [5]. The ability to monitor this particular frequency range poses an immense threat to India’s national security, as it can serve as a surveillance instrument capable of intercepting the encrypted telemetry data transmitted by India’s strategic missiles undergoing testing at Wheeler Island in Odisha. This interception can help foreign intelligence agencies reverse engineer important technical information, such as trajectories, radar signatures, and maximum velocities, of India’s most classified weapon systems.
Conclusion
The rapid transformation of Great Coco Island is a potential security challenge for India. This highlights the need to upgrade India’s capabilities in the Andamans to establish an all encompassing, technologically superior maritime domain awareness grid across the entire Bay of Bengal.
Footnotes
[1] Strait of Malacca significance: Hinrich Foundation – Why the Malacca Strait matters to global trade
[2] Myanmar’s 2021 Coup and China’s Role: United States Institute of Peace – Myanmar’s Military Coup
[3] Chatham House Report: Is Myanmar building a spy base on Great Coco Island?
[4] USIP/Jason Tower analysis: USIP on China-Myanmar relations
[5] Aerospace Security/Radar Analysis: Defence Security Asia – China’s Presence on Coco Islands
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