India-EU ties: Emerging Opportunities, Persisting Challenges

The recent visit of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to India, accompanied by almost the entire College of Commissioners, marked an important milestone in the evolving relations between India and the European Union (EU). It comes against the backdrop of a pressing geopolitical context, which has made collaboration increasingly beneficial to the two parties. The visit was highly significant and timely, though some, both within the EU and in India, saw it as poorly prepared and rushed. Nevertheless, it presented an opportunity to elevate India-EU relations substantially.

The relationship between India and the EU has a long history dating back to the early 1960s when India established diplomatic ties with the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the EU. Over the years, this relationship has evolved markedly, with both sides recognising the potential for mutual benefit through cooperation. In 2004, India and the EU formally established a strategic partnership, which was further strengthened by the launch of free trade talks in 2007. In the 15th India-EU Summit—the marquee institutional architecture for engagement between the two sides—held in 2020, the “India-EU Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025” was adopted.

Under this framework, the two sides aimed to enhance cooperation across a wide range of areas, including trade and investment, urbanisation and transport, research and innovation, culture, multilateralism, human rights, and civil society dialogues. The roadmap emphasised the importance of preserving a rules-based international order and effective multilateralism while also highlighting shared interests in security, prosperity, and sustainable development. However, despite these ambitious goals, implementation has been slow, with several key objectives, including a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA), remaining unrealised—leaving much room for improvement in translating the wishlist of ambitions into tangible outcomes.

The latest visit on 27-28 February 2025 of Ms. von der Leyen to India was a strategic move to deepen cooperation across multiple sectors—not least trade, technology, security, and climate change. It occurred at a particularly opportune moment in global geopolitics. The EU, facing potential tariffs from the US, views India as a critical partner in diversifying its trade and economic ties. Similarly, India, also seeking to diversify its trade ties and navigate the complexities of the Indo-Pacific region, views the EU as a key partner. The partnership between India and the EU is also potentially crucial for shaping a multipolar world order. Both sides recognise the importance of a resilient global system that supports peace, stability, and economic growth.

One of the key outcomes of the visit was the commitment to conclude a comprehensive FTA by the end of 2025. Such an agreement would not only enhance trade but also serve the strategic goal of de-risking supply chains and reducing dependence on other regions. Additionally, the second ministerial meeting of the India-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was held during the visit, focusing on deeper collaboration in various strategic and green technologies, as well as supply chain resilience. The visit also underscored the importance of enhancing security and defence ties, and exploring potential collaboration under the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework. This signals that India-EU security ties may deepen in unprecedented ways in the future. 

Despite the significant progress made during the visit, several challenges remain. Concluding a comprehensive FTA within the set timeline will require overcoming long-standing obstacles such as market access and regulatory frameworks. Key areas of contention include the EU’s excessive demands on intellectual property protections, which India fears could restrict its generic drug industry, and disagreements over sustainability standards, including labour and environmental regulations. Additionally, India is hesitant to open its market fully to sensitive EU exports like dairy and wine, while the EU seeks deeper tariff cuts across sectors.

Meanwhile, on climate issues, India views EU measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as unilateral and unconstructive. Instead, climate finance and public-private partnerships offer more effective pathways for a green transition. Both India and the EU must take into account complex geopolitical landscapes by balancing their strategic interests with other global partners. The success of the partnership will depend on the effective implementation of agreements and initiatives, requiring sustained political will and cooperation.

Besides the challenges of policy implementation, another less discussed challenge is the seeming divergence in political worldviews. The EU’s tendency to misunderstand or misrepresent India’s domestic affairs and its approach to human rights and national security issues remains a concern. The EU has often viewed India through a lens that does not reflect the complexities of India’s societal dynamics. For instance, the European Parliament’s resolution on ethnic violence in Manipur was a blatant and undesirable interference in India’s internal affairs, illustrating the EU’s tendency to evangelise its “values” without any understanding of the local context. The EU’s criticism of India’s Citizenship Amendment Act is another case of its stance being totally out of touch with the historical and legal context of the matter.

Additionally, the EU’s approach to Islamist forces, globally as well as within its own polity and society, ought to raise concerns. The EU’s one-sided stance on the ongoing violence in Syria is a case in point. By throwing its full weight behind the new regime under Ahmed al-Sharaa, the EU has strengthened the hand of jihadists in that region. At home, the growing influence of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in European institutions, which often lobby against policies targeting extremist ideologies, is worrisome. Such influence can lead to resolutions and policies that are favourable to Islamist interests, complicating the EU’s stance on terrorism—something that New Delhi should watch out for. Additionally, the EU’s frequent and undiplomatic criticism of India’s attitude towards Russia and the war in Ukraine betrays a lack of appreciation of historic, geopolitical and geo-economic realities.

While most of these issues will be overridden by the immediate strategic imperatives between the EU and India, they are nevertheless noteworthy in the longer term. At the very least, the EU must acquire an unbiased understanding of India’s complex societal and historical context. The partnership between the two sides is critical for shaping a multipolar world order, but it must be built on mutual respect and understanding. One hopes President von der Leyen and her colleagues will continue to find more occasions, or rather “excuses”, as she revealingly put it in one of her recent speeches, to immerse themselves in India.