December 24, 2025

Article 142 in Constitutional Governance: Scope, Restraint, and Institutional Balance

The author argues that by rejecting assumptions of consent or judicially set timelines and reaffirming the separation of powers, the Court has clearly defined the boundaries for the exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 142.
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In the case of the State of Tamil Nadu vs the Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025, the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 to treat 10 bills withheld by the Governor of Tamil Nadu as having received assent. Following this ruling by the Apex Court, India Foundation organised a Legal Dialogue to examine the scope, purpose, and constitutional limits of the Supreme Court’s power to do “complete justice” under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The discussion included jurists, lawyers, academicians, and policy experts who deliberated on the nature of Article 142 as an extraordinary provision and its relationship to the general constitutional scheme. Some major issues that were discussed included the distinction between Article 141 and Article 142, the prospects of Article 142 serving as a substitute for legislative or executive action, and the requirement of clearly articulated judicial standards governing its invocation. They also examined how repeated recourse to Article 142 in constitutionally sensitive matters may affect institutional accountability, federal balance, separation of powers, and democratic legitimacy. The discussion was triggered by a ruling of the Apex Court in which, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, 

Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous advisory opinion by a five-judge Constitution Bench in the 16th Presidential Reference, addressing several questions arising from its earlier judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025. The advisory opinion provides definitive clarity as to the roles of constitutional functionaries under Articles 200 and 201; whether it is permissible to prescribe a time period for exercising powers under those articles; what “deemed” means when used in respect to exercising powers under Articles 200 and 201; and above all, what are the limits of Article 142. This advisory opinion represents a pivotal point in constitutional jurisprudence and rebalances the relationship between judicial power and constitutional structure.

The Supreme Court has extensive powers under Article 142 to provide complete justice in any particular case. However, as the Advisory Opinion indicates, the powers granted under Article 142 are not unlimited. The Supreme Court referred to previous decisions such as the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002), where it reaffirmed that the powers of Article 142 cannot be used in a way that would contradict or replace express provisions of either the Constitution or a statute. The Supreme Court held that the idea of deemed assent to Bills before a Governor or President is not part of the Legislature’s constitutional framework, as defined in Articles 200 and 201. Instead, the Supreme Court held that constitutional authorities are given specific options for exercising their powers under the Constitution; thus, the judiciary cannot create alternatives to the authority conferred by constitutional provisions by invoking Article 142.

The advisory opinion stresses the importance of the separation of powers in constitutional government as an essential element of that principle. In particular, the advisory opinion cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) to support the Court’s conclusion that when deemed assent is granted, it represents a judicial usurpation of executive discretion previously held by Governors and the President. This usurpation of the Governor’s and President’s executive authority, as defined in the Constitution, contravenes the Constitution’s intent and the constitutionally delineated institutional framework between the Legislature and Executive branches. Furthermore, despite instances of prolonged inaction, the Court emphasised that constitutional fidelity requires that any remedy for such inaction by the Governor or the President remain within the limits of Article 142. Therefore, the Court stated unequivocally that the use of Article 142 cannot usurp or assume control over the functions of another constitutional authority.

With respect to parameters set by legislation, the Advisory Opinion provided directives regarding when such standards should be established. In Tamil Nadu Governor v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Advisory Opinion set out a timeline for the appointment of governors and the adoption of bills by the governor or president. The Advisory Opinion held that this was incorrect because the benchmark was imposed on both the Governor and the President by their respective legislative and governing systems. Citing an earlier case, Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker of Assam (2016), the Advisory Opinion stated that the phrase ‘as soon as possible’ does not permit judicial authority to impose rigid timeframes on how constitutional appointments are carried out. The Advisory Opinion distinguished between the roles of governors and quasi-judicial courts in setting timeframes. The Advisory Opinion noted that the functions of constitutional authorities operate within a distinct normative framework.

The Court concluded that the scope of Article 142 was limited by rejecting the argument that, if a deadline set by a judicial order expired, the parties would be presumed to have consented to whatever remedy the Court granted after the deadline. The Court further stated that if courts were allowed to create a de facto constitutional effect without any support from the Constitution, it would be inconsistent with the Constitution’s design and function. The Court emphasised that it is not within the scope of Article 142 to cure perceived constitutional problems by providing remedies that violate the Constitution; therefore, the general authority to do complete justice under Article 142 must be limited by the Constitution.

Given the Court’s acknowledgement of the concerns raised by the continued and unreasoned inaction of constitutional authorities, it recognised that indefinite & unreasonable wasting of legislative time undermines democratic governance and undermines any legitimate purpose that may have been behind this course of action. The advisory opinion, therefore, carefully balanced the concern over the lethargic pace of the legislative process with the understanding that any judicial intervention must be limited. It has been recognised that constitutional courts may issue narrowly defined orders directing the Governor to act in accordance with the provisions of Article 200, but those orders cannot be construed to advance their merits. Judicial review remains a component of the Basic Structure of the Constitution, as per Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), but it does not allow the Court to determine the appropriate choice for a constitutional authority to make.

The Advisory Opinion also has far-reaching implications on the federal structure in American law. By restoring the constitutional powers delegated to the States, this Supreme Court decision has clearly articulated that the principle of federal balance cannot be altered through any form of Judicially created or applied deemed assent or consent. The ability of courts to order Governors to act in a particular manner under Article 142 of the Constitution would lead to the centralisation of constitutional authority within the Courts and thus erode the functions or roles of State Institutions. Therefore, the court’s rationale supports federalism as a fundamental principle of constitutional construction.

The fundamental concerns expressed in the Advisory Opinion closely mirror those raised during the India Foundation Legal Dialogue, whose participants unanimously agreed that Article 142 should be used as a judicial safety valve rather than as an alternative source of constitutional power. They highlighted that Article 142 falls within Article 141 of the constitutional framework, thereby underscoring its supplementary relationship to Article 141. All precedents supporting this position affirmed that Article 142 cannot be used for legislative purposes, to replace substantive law, or to circumvent the procedural requirements of the constitution. This Advisory Opinion firmly defines the locus of Article 142 within the parameters outlined by the constitution.

The Supreme Court has provided doctrinal clarity on the interpretation of Article 142, confirming that it does not permit assumptions of consent or serve as an alternative to executive authority. In contrast to the earlier decision, the advisory opinion strengthens and confirms the unique nature of Article 142, holding that extraordinary powers derive from restraint rather than from expansive or frequent exercise. The judgment returns to a more restrained and disciplined view of the judiciary’s role in relation to other branches of government and of the courts’ historical function to intervene in exceptional circumstances.In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion marks a crucial milestone in the constitutional discourse on Article 142. By rejecting assumptions of consent or judicially set timelines and reaffirming the separation of powers, the Court has clearly defined the boundaries for the exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 142. The foundation of constitutional governance lies not only in the outcome but also in the methods used to reach it. While Article 142 remains a significant tool for the judiciary, its application is confined within the constitutional framework. The advisory opinion will help ensure that the pursuit of full justice occurs through constitutional means and that the independence of the judiciary and the integrity of India’s constitutional framework are maintained.

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Shatakshi Pathak

Shatakshi Pathak is a Research Associate at India Foundation, where she focuses on tech policy, cybersecurity, defence innovation, and online gaming. With a strong legal background, she brings policy insight into how emerging technologies shape India’s national security landscape. She contributes to policy briefs, stakeholder consultations, and research reports. She has worked in the fintech domain at Bridge Policy Think Tank and interned at MeitY and Chase Advisors, gaining experience in crypto policy, Web3, and digital governance. Shatakshi holds an LL.M. in Corporate Law from Maharashtra National Law University, Aurangabad, and a B.A. LL.B. from IP University, Delhi.

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