When Paris Is Not Enough: How the Law of the Sea Became a Climate Law

The central question of COP31 is not merely whether States have implemented their climate pledges, but whether those commitments are legally and scientifically adequate to meet their obligations.
Keywords: COP31, ITLOS Advisory Opinion, Climate Change Litigation, UNCLOS, State Responsibility, Climate Due Diligence, Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
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The thirty-first Conference of the Parties (COP31) began in Antalya on 9 November 2026 under a Turkish presidency. The host country has described it as an “Implementation COP”, with adaptation, adaptation finance, and delivery of Paris commitments among its stated priorities. The theme invites a harder question than it first appears: implementation measured against what? The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea answered in 2024 that delivering a pledge does not, by itself, settle a State’s legal duty.

The initial days have shown why the question matters. Delegates adopted the agenda without objection on opening day, and the COP president called the swift adoption a positive start, saying the 1.5°C goal must not be abandoned. Yet an African request for separate agenda items, including one on tripling adaptation funding, was not taken up for lack of consensus, and adaptation finance will instead be handled across other negotiating strands. The head of UN Climate Change told delegates that progress is “nowhere near fast or fair enough”.

The ocean has absorbed more than 91 per cent of the excess heat retained in the climate system, and between 2015 and 2024, around 29 per cent of the carbon dioxide increase in the atmosphere has been released by human activity. For low-lying island states, the consequences are not a distant ecological concern but a question of territory, livelihood and survival. It is hardly surprising that some of them chose to test whether the law of the sea could answer a problem that the Paris Agreement, which does not compel its Parties to reduce emissions to any specific level, leaves largely to voluntary national pledges.

On 31 October 2021, at the Glasgow climate summit, Antigua and Barbuda and Tuvalu established the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS). On 12 December 2022, COSIS asked the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for an advisory opinion; in response more than 50 States, intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations made written or oral submissions. On 21 May 2024, the Tribunal delivered its unanimous opinion in Case No. 31.

The central finding is that anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions constitute “pollution of the marine environment” under Article 1(1)(4) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Tribunal found that each element of that definition was satisfied: a substance or energy, introduced by humans into the marine environment, with deleterious effects. It treated the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as authoritative statements of the science, and the consequence is considerable. Article 194, which requires States to take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution from any source, now applies to emissions.

The Tribunal then set the standard as well. The obligation is one of conduct, not of result, but the due diligence it demands is “stringent”, given the risk of serious and irreversible harm. A State must maintain a national system of legislation, administrative procedures, and enforcement, and exercise adequate vigilance over its operation. The precautionary approach applies, so scientific uncertainty is not a reason to delay action. Environmental impact assessments are required where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an activity may cause substantial pollution or significant harmful changes, and they should address cumulative effects. In case of trans-boundary pollution, the standard can be “even more stringent”.

The most consequential holding is also the least noticed. The Tribunal held that a State does not necessarily discharge its obligations under UNCLOS “simply by complying with the obligations and commitments under the Paris Agreement”. It treated the Paris Agreement, including its temperature objective, as a relevant reference, but did not tie the meaning of “necessary measures” to the nationally determined contributions that each Party sets for itself.

The question is no longer only whether a State has met its own pledge, but whether that pledge and the regulation behind it are adequate when measured against the best available scientific data. That is a more demanding question, and one that a court can ask.

The opinion is equally attentive to equity. The Tribunal read into Article 194(1) elements of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities: States with greater means must do more, the measures available to developed and developing States may differ, and every State must still make mitigation efforts. The chapter on which this article draws adds that Articles 202 and 203 impose a positive duty on developed States to assist developing countries with capacity-building and technology. The point bears on the adaptation-finance dispute that surfaced on the opening day in Antalya, although Articles 202 and 203 concern assistance in capacity-building and technology, not finance as such.

The opinion did not stand alone. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights adopted Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 on 29 May 2025, at the request of Chile and Colombia, and recognised duties to reduce GHG emissions, regulate private conduct, and assess environmental impacts. On 23 July 2025, the International Court of Justice delivered its own advisory opinion on the obligations of States in respect of climate change, drawing on treaty and customary international law, after submissions from nearly 100 States. A request for a comparable opinion was lodged with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 2 May 2025. As per legal scholars, the first three opinions constitute an “advisory trilogy”.

What follows from all this is, in part, a matter of argument rather than settled law. Henceforth, national regulators, courts, and citizens are expected to apply the stringent due diligence standard when examining approvals for new infrastructure, and small island states are expected to cite the opinion in future negotiations. A persistent failure to take the necessary measures may engage State responsibility and, under Part XV of UNCLOS, compulsory dispute settlement. How far any of this goes will depend on how governments, regulators, and courts choose to use the opinion.

The General Assembly has since moved in the same direction. In May 2026, it adopted, by 141 votes to 8 with 28 abstentions, a resolution led by Vanuatu that endorses the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion of July 2025. Negotiators in Antalya are, therefore, working with three judicial opinions, and an Assembly endorsement of one of them, in the background. Whether implementation is to be judged by what States pledged or by what the science and the law require is a question these texts have already begun to answer.

For the States that brought the request, the law of the sea now offers an argument from law where, until recently, they  could only appeal. For everyone else, the message is that a pledge is a beginning of compliance, not proof of it.

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Yashasvi Singh

Yashasvi Singh is an Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Former Head Legal – Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority, Government of Telangana.

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