The South Asian security landscape has long been dominated by the fraught and adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan. Born out of partition, the two nations have diverged not only in political ethos and state-building trajectories but also in strategic doctrines. While India, owing to its size and capabilities, has historically pursued conventional military superiority and diplomatic multilateralism, Pakistan has opted for asymmetric strategies to counterbalance its structural disadvantages. At the core of Pakistan’s security calculus lies a paradox: a persistent engagement in proxy warfare alongside a carefully cultivated narrative of strategic victimhood. This paradox is neither coincidental nor reactive—it is systemic. It reflects an ideologically driven military doctrine that leverages non-state actors for state ends, while simultaneously exploiting global normative frameworks to present Pakistan as a casualty of terrorism and instability. This commentary exposes the institutionalisation of asymmetric warfare in Pakistan’s strategic culture, the deliberate use of victimhood as an international narrative, and the implications for regional stability. Furthermore, it examines the limitations of India’s current response strategy and proposes an alternative security architecture rooted in cooperative regionalism through platforms like BIMSTEC.
The Institutionalization of Asymmetric Warfare
Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has operated under the shadow of India’s overwhelming conventional military advantage. Rather than pursuing parity through direct military competition, Pakistan has made asymmetric warfare a state doctrine, particularly in the form of proxy conflict. This has been enabled and perpetuated by the Pakistan Army’s doctrinal orientation, which views confrontation with India not as a contingency but as a structural necessity.
Christine Fair, in her seminal work Fighting to the End, describes the Pakistan Army as a revisionist institution whose strategic culture thrives on a permanent state of hostility with India. This orientation transcends tactical calculations; it is embedded in the military’s perception of national identity and existential legitimacy. In this worldview, maintaining enmity with India serves to justify the military’s disproportionate influence over Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy. Drawing upon Barry Buzan’s security framework in People, States, and Fear, one can understand this perpetual antagonism as a form of negative identity construction. Pakistan defines itself in contrast to India—a process of othering that renders peace not just unlikely, but undesirable from the perspective of the security establishment. This identity-based antagonism has found operational expression in the cultivation and deployment of Islamist militant groups as proxies. Organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Haqqani Network have been instrumentalised to serve strategic ends. These groups offer Pakistan plausible deniability, the ability to operate below the threshold of conventional war, and they are tools used to maintain persistent pressure on India, particularly in Jammu & Kashmir. These proxy instruments are not ad hoc resorts but are part of a long-term doctrinal strategy, well-documented by think tanks such as the RAND Corporation.
RAND’s assessments confirm operational and logistical linkages between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and various terrorist networks. These relationships enable Pakistan to conduct what is known as grey-zone warfare—military operations on the threshold between peace and open conflict. The ambiguity of such engagements allows Pakistan to maintain strategic leverage while avoiding symmetrical retaliation from India or sanctions from the international community. This strategy aligns closely with Thomas Schelling’s notion of the diplomacy of violence, wherein the threat and controlled application of force serve to coerce outcomes without escalating into full-scale war. By calibrating violence carefully—such as through cross-border terror attacks that hurt the target but do not trigger war—Pakistan exercises a form of strategic brinkmanship.
Victimhood as Strategy
Perhaps the most audacious and effective aspect of Pakistan’s security strategy is its simultaneous claims of victimhood. While fostering and facilitating terrorism through non-state actors, the Pakistani state positions itself on the global stage as a victim of terrorism. This is not merely a contradiction but reflects calculated duplicity—what might be termed strategic hypocrisy. Constructivist theories in international relations provide a framework to explain how states assume identities. Pakistan has effectively crafted a dual identity: on one hand, it represents itself as a state threatened by domestic terrorism (such as that from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP); on the other, as a regional actor committed to human rights and regional stability. This performance is most vividly enacted at international forums like the United Nations, where Pakistan frequently raises the issue of alleged human rights violations in Jammu & Kashmir, seeking to portray India as a colonising aggressor.
This rhetorical maneuvering offers two clear advantages. First, it internationalizes the Kashmir conflict, countering India’s longstanding assertion that it is a bilateral issue. Second, it helps justify Pakistan’s internal security crackdowns, such as those in Balochistan, under the guise of counterterrorism. Thus, Pakistan diverts international scrutiny from its support for terrorism and human rights violations. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, in their exploration of the normative power of international relations, argue that states adapt their behavior—or at least their rhetoric—to align with dominant global norms. Pakistan’s invocation of the post-9/11 War on Terror paradigm exemplifies this. By repositioning itself as a frontline ally in the U.S.-led war on terror, Pakistan was able to attract military and financial aid even while continuing to harbour terrorist groups.
Even when grey-listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for terror financing, Pakistan managed to evade stringent penalties. Its geostrategic location—particularly its proximity to Afghanistan and close ties with China—shielded it from meaningful international censure. The global preoccupation with great power competition, especially in the context of China and the United States, has rendered consistent international enforcement of anti-terror norms elusive. This is relevant to Stephen Krasner’s concept of organized hypocrisy which illustrates how international norms and principles are inconsistently applied, especially when great power interests are at stake. In Pakistan’s case, its strategic location has led its patrons to eschew normative consistency, allowing it to operate beneath the radar of punitive accountability.
India’s Internal Fallout: Strategic Patience or Strategic Paralysis?
The most direct and sustained victim of Pakistan’s proxy warfare is India. Nowhere is this more evident than in the region of Jammu & Kashmir, where cross-border terrorism and insurgency have wrought havoc for decades. From the 1989 uprising to the Pulwama attack in 2019, Pakistan’s role in these terrorist operations has been documented extensively and has inflicted profound costs—human, economic, and political.
India’s traditional response has been one of strategic restraint—a policy praised for its responsibility but often critiqued for its passivity. While India conducted surgical strikes in 2016 and the Balakot airstrikes in 2019, these were largely reactive measures. India’s broader posture remains one of containment, which, while avoiding escalation, has not fundamentally altered Pakistan’s calculus.
This persistent threat has also stunted regional cooperation. SAARC, envisioned as South Asia’s primary multilateral forum, has been rendered dysfunctional due to Pakistan’s obstructionism. Pakistan has consistently blocked anti-terrorist initiatives, economic integration proposals, and regional connectivity efforts, effectively using SAARC as a veto platform. Institutionalist theory highlights that for international organisations to function effectively, members must share baseline norms and goals. SAARC’s failure is not just bureaucratic; it is structural, a reflection of Pakistan’s deliberate sabotage aimed at preventing regional consolidation under India’s This persistent threat has also stunted regional cooperation. SAARC, envisioned as South Asia’s primary multilateral forum, has been rendered dysfunctional due to Pakistan’s obstructionism. Pakistan has consistently blocked anti-terrorist initiatives, economic integration proposals, and regional connectivity efforts, effectively using SAARC as a veto platform. Institutionalist theory highlights that for international organisations to function effectively, members must share baseline norms and goals. SAARC’s failure is not just bureaucratic; it is structural, a reflection of Pakistan’s deliberate sabotage aimed at preventing regional consolidation under India’s leadership. India must therefore recognise the structural limitations of SAARC and adopt a more future-oriented, regional approach. This means rising above the bilateral gridlock with Pakistan and investing in multilateral frameworks that prioritise action over rhetoric and functionality over inclusion.
Towards a Post-Pakistan Security Architecture
In this context, BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) offers a viable alternative. Though it brings together India with other states of the region: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Thailand, BIMSTEC excludes Pakistan—an omission that is both symbolic and strategic. It allows India to pivot toward a regional architecture unencumbered by Pakistani intransigence. BIMSTEC represents not merely a geographic reorientation but a normative and strategic one. It embodies Hedley Bull’s idea of an anarchical society—a community of states that voluntarily cooperate based on shared norms and interests, even in the absence of central authority. Within this forum, India can lead efforts in counter-terrorism cooperation, maritime security, cyber defense, and economic integration.
To fully utilise BIMSTEC’s potential, India should focus on three strategic pillars:
- Counter-terror Cooperation: Establish a BIMSTEC Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Coordination Centre to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing and joint operations planning.
- Defence and Doctrine Harmonisation: Initiate joint military exercises and harmonise regional defence doctrines to foster interoperability and deterrence credibility.
- Economic Statecraft: Drive infrastructure investment, digital connectivity, and energy trade within the BIMSTEC region to create interdependencies that counteract the appeal of extremist ideologies.
Furthermore, India must engage in narrative warfare. For too long, Pakistan has monopolised the rhetorical battlefield. India must leverage digital diplomacy, regional media, educational exchanges, and cultural initiatives to project a narrative about inclusivity, the rule of law, and economic opportunity. India must become not a regional hegemon but a normative leader.
From Reactive Strategy to Regional Vision
Pakistan’s paradoxical strategy of fomenting terrorism while pleading victimhood has long skewed the strategic balance in South Asia. Its asymmetric warfare doctrine, combined with rhetorical manipulation of international norms, has imposed significant costs on India and paralyzed regional cooperation. Yet, India’s policy response has remained largely reactive, bounded by the logic of containment and bilateralism.
The time has come for strategic clarity and normative reimagination. India must move beyond the Pakistan-centric gridlock that has defined South Asian geopolitics for decades. By embracing BIMSTEC and fostering a regional security architecture grounded in shared norms and mutual interests, India can highlight Pakistan’s duplicity while offering an alternative vision for the region.
In the final analysis, the answer to proxy war is not merely a kinetic response but strategic transformation. India’s strength lies not just in its military or economy but in its ability to lead a new regional order—one that is plural, secure, and forward-looking. Only then can the paradoxical policy that Pakistan has long weaponised be truly neutralised.
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